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Summary findings
The 1994 World Bank  study  Adjustment in  Africa:  a real opportunity for the CFA franc  zone countries to
Reforms,  Results,  and the Road  Ahead  assessed  the extent  restore growth.
of, and economic  payoffs  from, policy  reform in 29  Many countries have  made considerable  progress in
countries in Sub-Saharan  Africa  in the mid-1980s  and  moving  toward competitive  rral exchange  rates.  Therc
1990s.  Here Bouton,  Jones, and Kiguel  update the  still remains  the challenge  of reducing  budget deficits  in
results  of that report with 1992 macroeconomic  data and  ways  consistent  with poverty-reducing  growth. Henice
explore some issues  in more detail.  the need to reorient public  spending  to the essential  tasks
The condusions of the earlier report still hold:  of goverrnment,  especially  providing  social  serviccs.
Improved  policies  arc still  associated  with improved  Reform  in two areas  will be important to sustaining  fiscal
performance,  but countries  fall  short of having  sound  reform: implicit  subsidies  to public  enterprises  must bc
policies.  In fact, the 1991-92 policy  stance  was not as  cut, and the cost of restructuring  the banking sector must
strong as the 1990-91 stance, reflecting  the slow, fragile,  not be absorbed  by the budget.
and often reversal-prone  nature of macroeconomic  Policy  reforms  undertaken so far have  paid off in
reform in Africa.  higher growth rates,  but the level  of growti is still  too
Getdng the real exchange  rate right  and reducing  the  low to sustain  rapid rates of poverty  reduction. Increased
fiscal  deficit should be the top priority for restoring  growth seems  to have come  more from effident use of
growth. Countries  that significantly  reduced their budget  existing  capacity  than from new investmenLr  Only steady
deficits  and reduced the black  market premium (by  and increased  policy reform  will convince  investors  of
devaluing)  enjoyed  the greatest payoffs  from reform.  the credibility  of reform and thus of a more favorable
Devaluation  of the CFA franc  in January 1994 represents  investment  climate.
This  paper -a  product  of the Macroeconomics  and Growth  Division,  Policy  Research  Department  -is  part of a larger  effort
inthe departmcnttounderstandthe  links  between  poliqcreform,  grovwh,  and  povcrty  reduction.  Copies  cf  the paperare  available
fre fromtheWorldBank,  1818  H StreetNW,Washington,  DC20433.  Pleasecontct RebeccaMartin,  roomNll-059, exrension
39026 (pages).  December  1994.
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1.  Many African countries initiated reform programs in the mid 1980s to remedy their severe
balance of payments problems and reverse their economic decline.  The recent World Bank study
Adjaistmenr  in Africa  Refornis Remmits  and  the Rnad  Ahesad  (World Bank, 1994)  assessed the extent of
policy reform and its economic payoffs in twenty-nine counries  in Sub-Sabaran Africa.  It found that
many countries had undertaken substantial macroeconomic and other policy changes which helped to
restore growth.  But even with the policy changes, policies in these countries were sdll far from what is
considered to be conducive to sustainable economic growth.  In this paper we update the results of
Adjustrnenr  in Afrirz with the 1992 macroeconomic data and explore a few issues in more detail.  The
conclusions of the earlier report still hold:  improved policies are still associated with better performance,
but countnes fail short of having sound policies. In fact, there was an overall deterioration in the 1991-92
policy stance compared with the 1990-91 stance, indicatng the fragile, slow and often reversal-prone
nature of macroeconomic reform in Africa.  The 1992 drought in Southern Africa may be partly
responsible for several countries' lack of progress on improving the policy stance, but the fact remains that
many countries, even in 1992, were still far from having sound policies.  Only in 1994, with the
devaluation of the CFA fianc,  is there likely to be a large improvement in the policy stance.
2.  As in Adjniutent  in Afrir2, we analyze progress in macroeconomic reform from two
perspectives. using the 1992 macroeconomic and national accounts data that have recently become
available.  First we evaluate how much progress countries have made relative to their initial positions.
Second, we assess how macroeconomic policies compare to those that are generally considered to be sound
or conducive to susained  macroeconomic growth.  The objective is to evaluate how far countries have
come, and how much farther they have to go to reach the macroeconomic "policy frontier."  For
comparauve purposes, countries that have, for example, a black market premium for foreign exchange and
an inflation rate of less than 10 percent and an overall budget deficit of less than -1-5 percent are
considered to be at the policy frontder. Changes in policies are then related to changes in performance to
assess the payoffs to reform.  The sample of countries remains the same as in Adfijthnent in Afrika -
those countries that implemented adjustnent programs at some point during the period 1987-1991,
excluding the strife torn and very small island economies!
In addition  to the small economies  of Cape Verde.  Comoro,  Djibouti.  Equatorial  Guinea.  Sao  Tome
and  Priie  and the Seychelles,  the study excluded  Angola.  Ethiopia.  Liberia.  Somalia,  Sudan  and Zaire because  of the
extent to wlhch  civil  unrest has affected thicr economies. Botswana,  Lesotho,  Maurids.  Nainibia,  South  Africa and
Svziland were  also  excluded  from  dhe  study  because  thy had a tradition  of better policies  and were less  affected  by the
external  problems  of the early 1980s. For more informaton  on country  coverage  see Box Table 1.3  of  Adrsimuet in
Afric (World  Bank, L994).The Need for Macroeconomic  Policy  Reform
3.  In the mid 1970s  GDP growth had begun to stagnate  or turn down in many  Sub-Saharan
African  economies. The situation  worsened  in the first half of the 1980s.  with further deteriorations  in the
terms of trade  and sharply reduced  access  to international  finance. While there is no single  explanation  for
Africa's poor economic  performance,  poor policies  played  a major role.  Inappropriate  fiscal policies
contributed  to the economic  crisis. The increase in export revenues  in many countries  during the
commodity  booms of the second half of the 1970s  led to large increases  in public  expenditures. The ratio
of government  consumption  to GDP increased  steadily  since the early 1960s,  reaching a peak in the late
1970s,  exceeding  chose  in other regions by around 50%.  Governments  failed to adjust  their levels of
expenditures  to the decline  in revenues  that occurred  when the commodity  booms  ended. As a result,
fiscal deficits  increased  in many  countries, often  resulting  inflationary  financing  or the accumulation  of
large arrears on domestic  and external  debt. Inflation  led to an appreciation  of the real exchange  rate, with
negative  consequences  for export  producers. The expansion  of the state into the productive  sector also
contributed  to the crisis. In the 1970s  governments  began  to nationalize  enterprises  and financial
institutions  and adopt a panoply  of controls.  regulations  and licensing  procedures. The expansion  of the
public and parapublic  sectors  constrained private initiative  and undermined  macroeconomic  stability  while
providing  huge rents  tO the elites.
4.  The downtrn in the terms of trade and the debt crisis in the early 1980s  exposed the
weaknesses  of the policy regime. The decline  in the terms of trade reduced  export  revenues  and increased
fiscal and current account  deficits. External  debt kept mouming  from already high levels and countries
increased  foreign borrowing  to cover their deficits. The foreign  exchange  crises worsened,  as countries
imposed  exchange  controls  to deal  with the external  imbalance  rather than devalue their exchange  rates.
Without  adjustments  m the official  exchange  rates, the economies  were caught  in a vicious  circle.
Increases  in the parallel market  premium for foreign  exchange  reduced  incentives  for exporters  to go
through  official  channels  and thus led to further deteriorations  in the trade balance,  forcing  the authorities
to unpose even tighter import restrictions.  Fewer imports  and a worsening  of export prices in domestic
currency terms reduced  the supply  of official  exports, leading  to a fiuther increase  in the premium.
Growth  rates plummeted.
5'.  The crisis took a somewhat  different  form in the CFA countries. They too experienced  a
decline  in their terms of trade, increasing  external  imbalances,  and overvalued  real exchange  rates, but
because of the particular instititional arrangements of the franc zone which guarantee the convertibility of
the CFA, they did not impose  foreign  exchange  controls. The deterioration  in their international
competitiveness  contrilted  to the severe recession  that took hold in these countries  during the second half
of the 1980s.
6.  By the mid-1980s  many African  countries  were caught  in a severe economic  crisis.  Their
economies  were in decline,  there were severe  external  imbalances,  and distorted  policies  exacerbated  dLe
problems. After peaking  in 1977, real GDP per capita  in Sub-Saharan  Africa fell 15%  between 1977 and
1985. By the mid-eighties  there were no clear signs  that the decline  in income  would stop. Faced  with
severe macroeconomic  imbalances  and economic  recession.  counries were forced to look for new
strategies  to restore macroeconomic  balances  and bring about economy  recovery. They  began tcc
implement  reform programs  aimed at creating  the conditions  for sustainable,  broad-based  growth. The
programs focused on restoring  macroeconomic  stability  and removing  the supply  side constraints  that
-2-inhibited growth.  The macroeconomnic  components of these programs sought to tighten fiscal and credit
policies to reduce overall expenditure in the economy while bringing about a real devaluation of the
currency to expand production in the tradable sector and complement the expenditure-reducing effect of
tight monetary and fiscal policies.  T'he extent of policy reform varied considerably. depending on each
country's  initial conditions and its assessment of whether the reforms were necessary, useful. and
politically feasible.
Measuring  Improvements  in Macroeconomic  Policies
7.  By 1987, over half the countries in our sample had initiated reform programs.  with the
rest to follow during the next five years,  at least on raper.  Macroeconomic reforms were a key part of
every program.  But how much reform actually tool place?  To answer that question.  A4justmentin
Africasconstructed a set of indicators to assess changes in exchange rate, monetary and fiscal policies.  It
also developed indicators of macroeconomic policy stance as a way to assessing how much additional
change was needed.  This paper presents the results of the indicators updated with 1992 data.2 It confirms
the key finding of Adjtirtment in Afrim,  namely that improvements in policy in 1987-92 relative to 1981-
86, while in some cases quite significant, were not sufficient to establish a policy stance conducive to
sustained growth.  Countries have come a long way, but they still have a long way to go. as the following
discussion of changes in exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policies shows.
-Echange  rate  policy
8.  Indicators.  Correcting exchange race misalignment is the principal goal of exchange rate
policy.  Overly expansionary monetary and fiscal policies in many Sub-Sahar2n African countries led to
an appreciation of the real exchange rate that reduced incentives for the production of  tradable goods.  In
addition, declining terms of trade also led to a structural misalignment, necessitating a real exchange rate
depreciation to restore competitiveness and macroeconomic equilibrium.  However, the very different
exchange rate regimes in the region call for different methods of assessing the exchange rate policy stance.
For the group of countries that had effective recourse to a nominal devaluation of their currencies during
this period-countries  outside the franc zone-the  black market premium is often used as an indicator of
exchange rate policy.  The black market premimn is an imperfect  indicator of the extent of overvaluation,
since it is sensitive to temporary shocks that may have little or not effect on the underlying fundamenual
REER,  and it also reflects the risks of transactions in the parallel market?3 However, a high susined
premium is strongly suggestive of overvaluation and thus serves as a very useful proxy.  Thus. we use the
change in the black market premium, as weli as its level, as key indicators of changes in exchange rate
policy and stance.  We also include the change in the REER in constructing the index of exchange rate
policy change, as it provides a measure of the extent to which macroeconomic policies shiftd  incentives in
favor of the tradable sector.  A sustained decline in the premium and a depreciation of the REER  indicate
that exchange rate policy is moving in the direction of correciing the misalignment of the real exchange
rate.
Amex A discusses  how  data revisions  and the inclusion  of the 1992  affect  the macroeconomic  policy
scores.
See Kiguel  and O'Conndll (1994).
-3-9.  For countries  in the franc zone, the black  market premium is not  a useful indicator  of the
extent of exchange  rate misalignment. Although  for all intents  and purposes  no parallel foreign  exchange
market existed in the CFA countries  because  of the guaranteed  convertibility  of the CFA franc. the real
exchange  rate was considered  to be overvalued  in the second  half of the 1980s  and early 1990s,  in the
sense  that it was out of line with the fumdamentals,  especially  with the decline  in the terms  of trade. While
changes  in the REER index  can be used to assess the extent  to which incentives  were shifted  in favor of the
tradeable  sector, the REER  cannot  be used  directly  to assess the extent of real exchange  rate
overvaluation. Adjustment  in Afr-n developed  a simple  indicator  based on a comparison  of the extent of
real depreciation  in CFA countries  with a group  of countries  outside  Africa  that experienced  similar terms
of  trade shocks. The methodology  is described  below in the evaluation  of exchange  rate policy  stance in
CFA countries.
10.  Chnges  in erehnnge nate  liecy.  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  needed  to effect a real
depreciation  in light of changes  in terms  of trade and other macroeconomic  fundamentals.  How much
improvement  has there been in changing  relative  prices in favor of the tradable  sector? Because  of  the
differences  in initial  conditions  (by and large the non CPA countries  entered  the 1980s  with significandy
more overvalued  real exchanges  than  the CFA countries)  and the policy  levers  that were available  to them
during this period, it is not surprising  that there are considerable  differences  between  the non-CFA  and the
CFA franc zone countries  regarding  the size of depreciation  in their REERs. As shown in table 1 and
figure 1, on average, non-CPA  adjusting  countries  managed  t  achieve  large real depreciations  between
1981-86  and 1987-92,  with an average real depreciation  of almost 99% between  the two  periods.  In
contrast, the CFA countries  on average actually  experienced  a small real appreciation  during this period,
and reversed it only with the nominal  devaluation  of the CFA franc in January 1994.
11.  There are two main explanations  for the disparity in outcomes  between  the two groups.
First, their initial  conditions  differed. Non-CFA  adjusting  countries  initially  had markedly  overvalued
exchange  rates, which  were defended  primarily  through  foreign  exchange  rationing  and trade restricdons.
as evidenced  by the high parallel market  premiums. They  clearly needed  real depreciations  to deal with
their highly  distorted  policy regimes. even  before they  were hit by terms of trade shocks  in the late
seventies  and early 1980s. In contrast,  the real exchange  rates in the CFA countries  were less overvalued
entering  the 1980s. The growth  performance  of the franc zone countries  was  generally  better than that of
the highly  distorted  economies  outside  the zone  in the 1970s  and first half of the 1980s. In fact, the franc
zone countries  experienced  a reaL  depreciation  between  1980  and 1985  as the dollar  strengthened  against
the French franc, partially  compensating  for the losses in export revenues  resulting  from the fall in terms
of trade during the first half of the decade.  As they  entered the second  half of the 1980s,  the franc zone
countries  needed a smaller real depreciation  than  did most of the countries  outside  the franc zone, but as
the terms  of trade declined  further and the CFA franc  appreciated  vis-a-vis  the dollar, their real exchange
rates became  increasingly  less competitive.  Hence, the CFA counties, like the non-CPA  countries,  still
needed  to depreciate  their real exchange  rates, even if the magnitude  of the required  depreciation  was
smaller.
12.  The fanc zone countries  found it difficult  to achieve  a real depreciation  of the required
magnitude  because  the "internal  adjustment"  (e.g. without  a nominal  devaluation)  strategy  they followed  up
to early 1994  to achieve  a real depreciation  was less effective  than the combination  of policies  used by
countries  outside  the franc zone. The non-CFA  countries  relied heavily  on nominal  devaluations  tc bring
-4Table  1.  Change  in the  Real  Effective  Exchange  Rate
Percent  change
from  1981-86  from  1980  from  1980
Counby  to 1987-92  to 1990  to 1991-92
Fixed  Exchange  Rate  Countries
Benin  -10.9  14.0  12.4
Burkdna  Faso  -3.8  12.3  14.9
Cameroon  -32.2  -26.3  -31.4
Central  African  Republic  4.0  7.9  17.0
Chad  -12.3  0.5  4.1
Congo  -5.8  -6.0  -10.0
Cote  d'lvoire  -25.5  -3.3  -2.4
Gabon  -0.9  6.2  18.4
Mali  -9.5  8.8  11.9
Niger  7.1  22.0  36.6
Senegal  -13.1  -5.3  -0.9
Togo  -- 3.9  7.5  10.9
Mean  -is.9  3.2  6.81l
AMedian  -7.6  - .9  1  1.4;
Flexible Exchange  Rate  Countries
Burundi  59.5  29.8  41.4
Gambia  21.3  37.3  42.2
Ghana  255.1  380.2  390.7
Guinea  NA  NA  NA
Guinea-Bissau  NA  NA  NA
Kenya  31.0  43.0  42.7
Madagascar  98.0  93.0  114.6
Malawi  8.0  9.7  9.2
Mauritania  32.6  20.7  18.1
Mozambique  107.2  27.0  73.5
Nigeria  369.9  252.2  361.0
Rwanda  18.8  -16.6  12.3
Sierra  Leone  66.2  22.8  28.2
Tanzania  261.1  171.9  176.3
Uganda  66.6  831.1  1173.8
Zambia  23.1  35.0  47.6
Zimbabwe  60.0  61.1  103.7
Mean  98.6  133.2  1757
|  Median  60.0  37.3  47.6
Note: An  increase  in the  index  indicates  a real  depreciation  of  the real  effective  exchange  rate.
Source: IMF and  Would  Bank Staff estimates.
-5-Figure 1
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Rates in Sub-Saharan Africa
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Note: Country  groups  are  unweighted  averages. An increase  in the index  indicates  a depreciation  of the  REER.
Source: IMF  and World  Bank  staff  estimates.about  a real depreciation. Since the  countries  in the franc zone eschewed  recourse  to a nominal
devaluation  until early 1994, they were forced  to rely solely  on tight fiscal  and monetary  policy to bring
about  a real depreciation. Keeping  domestic  inflation  below international  levels  proved to be a very slow
way at best of  depreciating  their currencies  in real terms, given  the rigidities  in wages and the price of
inontradables.  The task was  made even  harder by the depreciation  of the U.S. dollar relative to the French
franc following  the Plaza Accords  in the 1985  and the deceleration  of international  inflation.
13.  The progress  made by the non-CFA  countries  in depreciating  their real exchange  rates is
also reflected in the evolution  of their parallel  market premiums. Many  countries  have achieved  significant
progress in reducing  the premnium  since  the mid-1980s.  No country in the region  still has the exorbitant
three- and four-digit  premiums  of the early 1980s. Table 2 shows the average  exchange  rate premiums  for
1981-86  and 1987-92. The average  premium in the non-CFA  adjusting  countries  fell from 284% in 1981-
86 to 79% in 1987-92  and by 1993  had fallen furtder  to 33%.  Particularly  impressive  were the reductions
in Mozambique  (from 1899  % in 1981-86  to 46% in 1987-92),  Ghana  (1098% to 17%), Guinea  (656% to
6%), Tanzania  (249% to 74%), and Nigeria (222% to 37%). Not surprisingly,  countries  that effected
large real depreciations  (Ghana  experienced  a real depreciation  of 391%, Nigeria. 361% and Tanzania,
176%) also reduced their premiums  significantly. This indicates  that the official  exchange  rate was way
out of line in the pre-reform  period, and that large nominal  depreciations  were successful  in reducing the
distortion.
14.  In other countries,  the reduction  in the premium has been less dramatic. In some
countries the changes  in either direction  were relatively  moderate. Most  of these  countries  started with low
or moderate  premiums,  and hence it would  have  been  unreasonable  to a large change in the premium. The
Gambia, Madagascar,  and Malawi  - among  others  - fall in this group. Other countries, such as Zambia
and Sierra Leone, experienced  a large increase  in their premium in 1988-89  but were able to reduce them
by the early 1990s.  And in a third group  of countries,  there had been a deterioration  in performance: in
Rwanda, Kenya and Burundi,  for example,  premiums  have  risen since the mid-1980s.
15.  Fxrehan  r2tP pnliry  amnre,  Many  countries  took steps to improve  their exchange  rate
policies.  But were the changes  sufficient  to restore  macroeconomic  balances  and competitiveness?  For
the non-CPA  countries,  we use the black  market premium  as the indicator  of the extent to which countries
have had a realistic exchange  rate policy. The size of the premium is one indicator  of how much
adjustment  is needed. We classify  the non-CFA  countries  in four categories  based on the size of their
premiurn  in 1991-92:  small  premium  (less than 10%),  moderate  premium  (more than 10%  and less than
30%), high premium (more  than 30% and less than  50%), and extreme  premium  (more than 50%). As can
be seen from table 3, countries  made progress  in 1991-1992  in reducing  overvaluation  compared  to their
performance  in 1990-91,  the reference  period  used in Adjmunment  in  Afrirna  In 1993.  however. Nigeria,
Jganda and Guinea  all experienced  policy  reversals  with an increase  in the black  market premium.
16.  As noted  above, there is essentially  no parallel  market for foreign  exchange  in the CFA
countries,  and hence no black  market premmm. Thus another indicator  is needed  to assess whether  their
exchange  rates policies  are misaligned. Adjpqtment  in  Africa  used a simple  methodology  to obtain  a gross
assessment  of  the overvaluaiion,  which  consisted  of comparng the extent of real effective  rate
depreciation  in the franc zone  countries  with a group  of comparator  countries  that  experienced  roughly the
-7-Table 2. Parallel Market Exchange Rats Market Premium
Avaess
Country  1981-8  198742  1991-92  1993
Bu-rundi  24.1  25.0  45,2  41.2
The  Gambla  4,7  7.7  -42  2.5
Ghan  1098.2  '1.5  5.5  1.4
Guinea  658.1  5.0  5.5  21.5
Guine-Blssau  59.7  4.2  -8.8  4.7
Kenya  15.1  26.6  57.9  32.0
Madaascar  42.0  15.7  19.1  9.5
Malwr  53.5  27.7  39.1  32.4
Martanis  94.1  167.2  149.0  81.2
Mozambique  1899.1  45.5  1.7  -4.6
Nlgera  222.0  36.5  34.6  126.5
Rwanda  43.7  47.0  82.6  102.9
Sierra  Leoe  49.3  388.9  66.9  16.9
Tanzania  248.8  73.8  45.2  1.7
Uganda  159.4  126.7  13.2  33.6
Zenibla  45.7  281.8  43.3  .33.3
ZImbabwe  81.3  41.8  31.1  22.2
MIIn  283.9  7f7  38.9  3,01
Median  59.7  365  34.6  22  -
Note: The parallel  narket  exchange rate pramum  is calcldated
as the percentage difference  between the parallel  market exchange
rale and the offiCal  exchae  rate (In  domestc currency  at the
end of the period). Data aw for the non-CPA  counries only.
Source: International  Currncy Yearbook  and  IMF,  IFS.
-8-Table  3. Black Market  Premium  In  the 1990s
1990  1991  1992  1993  19-92
Extreme  Premium  In  1991-92
Mauritania  169.8  163.4  134.6  81.2  149.0
Rwanda  2B.0  67.0  98.3  102.9  62.6
Sierra Leone  165.0  43.7  90.0  16.9  66.9
Kenya  5.9  8.5  107.1  32.0  57.9
High  Premium  In 1991-92
Tanzania  7o.0  71.0  19.4  1.7  45.2
Burundi  5.8  36.1  54.3  412  45.2
Zambia  211.9  87.3  -0.7  33.3  43.3
Malawi  14i5  44A  33.8  32.4  39.1
Nigeria  23.4  26.8  42.5  128.5  34.6
Zimbabwe  14.9  32.0  30.3  22.2  31.1
Moderat Pwm.  ium  nI 1991-92
Madagascar  7.1  31.0  7.3  9.5  19.1
Uganda  39.8  9.3  17.1  33.6  132
Snall Premium  In 1991492
Guinea  12.5  2.7  8.4  21.5  5.6
Ghamn  7.3  -0A  11.4  1.4  5.5
Mozambique  94.0  -1.6  5.0  -4.6  1.7
Gambia.  The  2.6  -7.0  -11A  2.5  -4.2
Guinea-Bieau  -2.3  11.3  -28.9  4.7  -8.8
Note: The paralel market  exchange  rate pnwnium  is calcated
as the percentage  dffemence  betn  the palbl  maret exchange
rate and the official  exchange  rate (Cn  domestic  crrency at th
end of  fe  perod). Dat are  for  the nw-tFA countris only.
Source: Intemnaonal  Curmy  Yearbook  and lMF.  IFS.
-9-same movement  in their terms of Lwade  and started with roughly  similar  degrees  of overvaluation.4  Non-
CFA adjusting  countries  are not very helpful  for this purpose because  they  started  with grossly  overvalued
exchange  rates.  Instead  we use a set of other. non-African.  developing  countries  that are primarily
exporters  of primary nroducts  and that did not have  a significant  parallel  premium.5  The underlying
worldng  assumption  is that since  countries  in the CFA group  and countries  in the control group  faced
similar declines in the terms of trade, they should  have  depreciated  their real exchange  rates by roughly the
same amount  to adjust  to the decline  in their terms of trade, all other things  being  equal.
17.  The average real depreciation  (in domestic  currency  terms) between 1980  and 1990  was
60% in the control  group, compared  with an appreciation  of 2% in the CFA economies  (see table 1).
Judged by this criterion, the real depreciation  in the CFA zone has lagged  behind  that of other developing
countries.  Becausu  of differences  in their inflation  rates and differences  in their trading partners, there is
of course variation  within  the zone: at one extreme,  the real depreciainon  in Benin  was 11%; at the odter
extreme  in Cameroon  there was a 20% real appreciation.  in Congo 10% and in Senegal  6%.b In countries
outside  the region we find real depreciation  of 60% in Morocco,  45% in Tunisia,  50% in the Philippines,
104% in Irdonesia, 25% in Malaysia  and Thailand,  70% in Bolivia  and Costa Rica, and 122% in
Colombia. A few non-CFA adjusting  countries  have maintained  relatively  sound  macroeconomic  policies
and could  be relevant  comparators.  Among  them are Kenya, where the real depreciation  was 43%, and
Burundi. with a real depreciation  of 30% (though  in this country  the premium  increased. suggesting  that it
may need a larger depreciation). None of the CFA countries  was  judged  as having  a good or adequate
exchange  rate policy  as of end-1992,  though  following  the 100  percent  nominal  devaluation  of the CFA
franc relative to the French franc (in local currency  terms) in January 1994, they  have experienced  a
substantial  improvement  in their exchange  rate policy  stance.
Fiscal Adjustment
18.  Indicators.  No one fiscal indicator  can adequately  summarize  the changes  in fiscal policy
or the current stance. A thorough  analysis  requires  making  judgments  about current policies, and more
importanly, about  their sustinabiity.  A low budget  deficit  on a cash basis, maintained  by building  up
domestic  and foreign  arrears or by compressing  public  invesment to unacceptably  low levels. does not
mean fiscal  policy is prudent  because  it clearly  is unsustinable and works against  growth. Likewise,  even
a small reduction  in the budget  defick might  be evidence  of a big fiscal  effort if the reduction  is effected
through durable expenditure  cuts and equitable  and less distorcionary  tax increases. In addition,  there are
This provides  only  a very rough  estimate  based  on average  extent  of depreciation  in the group  of
comparator  countries.  First .there  are  differences  among  the  CFA  fnmc  zone  counties  in the  extent  of overvaluadon
even  in  dhe  early  198Ds  aud in the  size  of die  terms  of trade  shock  they  received.  Such  differences  in the  ndamentals
would  affect  the size  of the  needed  depreciation  Second,  while  we  atempted  to pick  a group  of comparator  countrie
that  were  rougbly  similar  to the  CFA  franc  zone  both  in the  initial  degree  of overvaluation  and  terms  of trade  evohton,
there may  be other  differences  in the fundamentas  (such  as long-term  capital  inflows  or differen  trade  regimes)  that
would  affect  the  comparison.
See Chapter  2, footnote  14, p. 60 of Adjiitmnent  in  Africa.
6  Niger  also  shows  a large  real  deprecation,  but this  result  is not consistent  with  other  information  an
the degree of real overvaluation  in Niger. Niger  is a difficult  case  in part because  of  the very large (and  often
unrecorded)  cross-border  trade  with  Nigeria,  which makes  it difficult  to determine  the  appropriate  nade  weight  to give
to Nigeria  in calculatng  the  REER.
-10-significant  data problems:  most African  countries  have only fiscal data for the central  governmnent,  while  a
hlrge part of the fiscal  problem lies in the public enterprise  sector.
19.  For the  purposes  of rantcing  countries  according  to the degree of improvement  in their
fiscal policy, we look at the progress  in reducing  the overall  fiscal deficit  (before  grants). This gives some
indicator  of the domestic  efforts being  made to close  the fiscal gap.  We also take into  account whether
there was a major effort to increase  revenues,  and give  an extra point in scoring the change  in  fiscal
policy to a country  that improved  its fiscal  deficit  by increasing  revenues  significantly. Conversely,  for
those countries  in which there was a significant  decline  in revenues,  we subtract  a point  from the fiscal
policy score.  The idea here is that in many  countries  it is probably  more beneficial  to reduce  the fiscal
deficit  by raising  revenues  through  a broadening  of the tax base than  to cut the overall level of expenditure.
With the relatively low share of public  invesunent.  the overall level of expenditure  in many  countries is
now not considered  to be highly  out of line, while  tax reveniues  as a share of GDP  tend to be low  in
comparison  to other regions. An additional  adjustment  to the scoring could  be made to reflect
improvements  in the pattern of expenditure. This was not attempted,  both for lack of data and also for
lack of clear no-ms about  what patterns  of public  expenditure  are associated  with higher  growth.  Another
difficulty,  evident in Mozambique  for example,  is the case  where the fiscal deficit  before grants increases
because  of a large increase in donor-fianced capital  expenditures. While increasing  dependence  on grants
raises questions  about  the sustainability  of the fiscal position,  an increase in the deficit  due to donor
financing  of capital  expenditure  is presumably  more likely  to be growth-enhancing  than, say, increase in
the deficit  due to an increase  in the wage bill. The scoring system  does not differentiate  between  these
cases, as it focuses only on domestic  efforts to reduce  the deficit.
20.  In assessing  the fiscal policy  stance  we look at the change in the overall  deficit  includig
grants, which shows  the amount  of financing  needed.  Because  most counties have limited  access  to
domestic  and foreign financing,  this indicator  measures  the potential  risks of governments  resorting  to
inflationary  finance or looking  for other distortionary  ways to finance  themselves  domestically  (such as
incurrimg  arrears with government  suppliers  or taxing  the financial  sector). The higher the budget  deficit
after grants, the further we assume  a country  is from having  sound and sustainable  fiscal policy.
However, it should be recognized  that heavy  reliance  on external  grants even in a cowutry  that has a low
fismrA  deficit may still raise questions  about  the soundness  of a country's fiscal  policy, given the fragility  of
external  assistance.
21.  Change in fislrM  poliey.  On  average, efforts to reduce the fiscal deficit have not been
successfill. Between  1981-86 and 1987-92  the fiscal  deficit excluding  grants increased  slightly  on average
for countries in the sample  (see table 4)- This was the result of the failure to reduce overall fiscal
expenditures  by more than the fail in fiscal  revenues. Govermment  revenues  fell on average by
approximately  1.4 percentage  point  of GDP between  1981-86  and 1987-92  while  overall expenditures  fell
0.8 percentage  point of GDP.  The reduction  in expenditures  came about  largely  through  the reduction  in
capitl  expenditures  and net lending  as current expenditures  experienced  a small  increase  over this period.
22.  It is useful to look at differences  in performance  between  the CFA and the non-CFA
countries, since the internal  adjustment  strategy  followed  by the CFA couatries relied heavily  on fiscal
policy to achieve  a real depreciation  of the exchange  rate.  In spice  of this. the CFA countries  were not as
successful  as the non-CFA  countries  in adjusting  their fiscal policies  in support  of  growth. On average,
the non-CFA countries  increased  their tax revenues,  on average around  0.9 percentage  points of GDP, and
they increased  capital expenditures  by 0.8 percentage  points, leading  to a small  net improvement  in their
-11-Table 4.  Fscal Policy
Overal Fisea Ddet  Overa0l  Fical Defict
Exluding Exeral  Gnt  hcluding Extel  Gnts
Avenge  Difference  btween  Average  Difference  between
Percnage of  GDP  1981-86  and 1987-92  Percentage  of GDPI  1981-86  and  1987-92
Comtny  198146  1987-92  1991-92  (vercenae pints)  1981-6  1987-92  1991-92  (percenage  points)
Beak  -13.7  -9.4  -7.5  4.3  -8.5  -6.4  -5.1  2.1
Buridina  Faso  -16.4  -8.2  -6.6  8.2  -9.0  -2.8  -2.7  6.2
Bunudi  -12.3  -1S.6  -21.0  -3.3  8.5  -9.3  -12.6  -0.7
Cainoon  0S  -7.9  -7.2  8.4  0.5  -7.9  -7.2  -8.4
Cenral  African  Republc  -7.S  -14.7  -17.0  -7.2  -4.3  -7.3  -10.1  -2.9
Congo  -7.6  -13.4  -17.1  -5.8  -7.3  -13.3  -16.9  -6.0
Cote  d'Ivoire  -6.4  -13.5  -13.6  -7.1  -6.4  -13.5  -3.6  -7.1
Gabon  0.2  -7.6  4.0  -7.8  0.6  -7.2  -3.7  -7.8
Gambia.  The  -13.9  -8.6  -4.3  5.3  -4.7  0.8  2.9  5.5
Gbana  -4.6  -S.9  -7.4  -1.3  . -4.3  -4.6  -6.0  -0.3
Kenya  -7.3  -6.5  -6.2  0.8  -7.3  4.6  -4.6  2.7
Madscar  -6.3  -5.0  -7.1  1.4  -5.8  -3.7  -6.0  2.1
Malawi  -11.4  -8.5  -10.7  2.9  -. 4  -4.7  -8.3  3.7
Mali  -12.8  -10.7  -11.7  2.1  -7.7  -S.0  -5.8  2.8
Mauritan  -5.2  -22  -1.3  3.0  4.3  -0.4  0.8  3.9
Mozambique  -16.2  -26.4  -25.5  -102  -13.7  -9.0  -5.4  4.7
Niger  -7.9  -9.7  -4.6  -1.8  4.3  -5.8  -6.8  -15
Nigeria  -S.8  -7.5  4.8  -1.7  -5.8  -7.5  -88  -1.7
Rwannd  -7.1  -11.6  -15.4  *4.5  -3.7  -7.  1  -7.8  -3.4
Senegal  -7.0  -2.4  -0.3  4.6  -6.0  -1.0  1.1  5.0
Sierra  Leone  -13.2  -10.9  -9.6  2.3  -12.0  -7.7  -4.3  4.3
Tanzaia  -11.0  -5.3  -2.  52  -8.5  -0.5  0.6  8.0
Togo  -7.0  -6.4  -5.2  0.6  -3.6  4.3  -3.8  -0.7
Uganda  -6.0  -7.2  -11.2  -1.2  -5.3  -3.2  -3.5  2-1
Zambia  -1S2  -132  -13.1  2.0  -14.4  -9.0  -43  5.4
Zimbabwe  -10.1  -102  -9.1  -02  -8.6  -3.3  -7.7  -0.3
Mean  -. 9  -9.6  -9.  -0.7  -6.6  -S.9  -5.7  0.7
Meda  -7.6  -8.5  -8.7  02  -6.2  -6.1  -5.6  2.1
CFA coutie
Me=  -7.8  -9.4  -9.0  -1.7  -5.  1  -6.8  -6.8  -1.7
Medan-  -7.3  -9.4  -73  -1.8  -6O  -6.4  -5.9  -1.5
Nm-CPA  countis
mean  4.7  -91  -103  0.0  -7.7  -5.3  -S.0  2.4
ME&n  -10.1  -3S  -9.1  0.8  -7.3  -4.7  -5A  2.7
Source:  IMF and World  Bank Staff estnue
*  ~~-1.2-overall  fiscal  deficit (excluding  grants). In contrast,  the pattern was reversed  in the CFA countries. On
average. they  had a large losses  in revenues  (4.5 percentage  points  of GDP), large decrease  in capital
expenditures  (2.8 percentages  points of GDP), and a small increase  in current expenditures. The result
was an overall increase  in their fiscal  deficits. The changes  in fiscal  policies-with heavy  reliance  on cuts
in capital  expenditures  rather than in the wage bill-were not sufficient  to bring about  a real depreciation  of
tle exchange  rate in a short period. The failure  to restore  competitiveness.  together  with the large cuts in
investment  spending, led to a deep economic  recession  in the late 1980s. The recession  in turn
undermined  tax collection  efforts which  led to a further  deterioration  in fiscal policy.  These policies
created  a vicious  circle, much  like the vicious  circle  engendered  by the strategy followed  by the non-CFA
countries  in the early 1980s  of dealing  with balance  of payments  crises by imposing  stricter  foreign
exchange  and trade controls,  which led to even  greater evasion  of the official  channels,  further  aggravating
undermining  their balance  of payments  problems.
23.  Fiscal stance. As can be seen from Table 5, progress  has been mixed in correcting  the
initial  fiscal  imbalances.  By and large, adjusting  countries  in the region  improved  their fiscal  performance
in die second  half of the eighties.  as the average  deficit  (including  grants) was reduced  by about I
percentage  point  of GDP (from 6.6 percent  of GDP in 1981-86  to 5.7 percent of GDP in 1991-92). Thus
on average, countries  moved  closer  to the policy  frontier,  although  the average improvement  disguises
important  differences  across  countries.  While Burkina  Faso, The Gambia,  Tanzania.  and Zambia  reduced
their deficits  by more than 5 percentage  points  of GDP, Cameroon  and Cote d'lvoire experienced
increases  of similar  magnitudes.  Again, there was a net difference  in the  perfonmance  of the CFA and non-
CFA countries,  related  to the adjustnent pursued  by the two  groups. The fiscal  stance of the CFA
counties worsened  as the recession  took hold.  The higher  deficits  were financed  pardy by external
borrowing  and pardy by the development  of huge internal  arrears, further contributing  to the economic
recession  of the zone. Although  the average  fiscal  deficit  in the CFA countries  was smaller  than in non-
CFA countries  in the first half of the 1988.  by 1991-92  deficits  in the CPA countries  were larger.
Monetary Policy
24.  Indictors. The main  goals of monetacy  policy  are to maintain  low rates of inflation  and
suitable  levels  of economic  activity.  Many  studies  associate  the rate of growth  of monetary  aggregates
with monetary  policy. This approach  has important  weaknesses,  however, as it does not deal with the
causality  between  monetary  growth  and inflation. In most countries  monetary  growth  is highly  correlated
with inflation,  especially  in the longer  term, but this does  not indicate  whether  money "causes"  (the
causality  running  from money  to inflation)  or if it "accommodates"  (the causality  running  from inflation  to
money)  inflation. Thus, while  countries  with rapid  expansion  of money  are generally  considered  as having
loose  monetary  policy  and those  with low rates of growth  are considered  to have  tight monetary  policy,
this is not always  the case. Some  countries  might  have  tight  money  while  money  grows at high rates
because  the rate of money  growth  does not fully  accommodate  inflation  (i.e. money  grows less than
inflation  and interest  rates are high), while  others  might  follow  expansionary  monetary  policy  while  having
apparently  low rates  of monetary  growth  that nonetheless  are inflationary.
25.  A betEer  indicator  of whether  monetar-y  policy  is supportive  of a stable  macroeconomic
environment  is the degree to which  governments  rely on printing  money  to finance  budget  deficits. This is
-13-Table 5. FI6SCl  Revenues  and Expenditures
Tbtal Revenue  Total  Expenditure  Capital Expenditure  & Net landing  Current  Expendlture
Avenge  _  Dlbrenc kreDifference  betwen  Averae  Dhifarecs  batbac  Avenge  Dffeu  bemn  D  i  bem
PeIcWugeOf  GOP  1981-86Ida  1987-92  Penetug  of  GDP  19Sl-e4u6dl  19S7.92  I'eaentaegof  GOP  i01-6and  1937-92  Per  genmofefGDP  1981-86eS198-92
Counity  1982-E6  1957-92 1991-92 (ecmauge painut)  1981-86 1917.92  1991-92  (merunuse  Polnu)  193146  1987-92 1991-92  (pereag  pairints)  17SI-86 197-92  199192  e pol)
Brnin  14.9  11.4  11.9  -3.4  2.S  20.8  19.4  -7.7  11.0  5.J  4.7  .5.3  17.5  IS.0  14.7  4.
Burkina  Ftao  12.9  22.7  13.3  -0.3  29.3  20.8  19.9  *S.5  15.1  8.2  7.7  *7.1  14.0  12.6  12.2  -1.4
BuDundi  13.9  13.4  9.3  40.5  26.2  29.0  30.3  2.8  13.7  14.6  16.3  0.9  IS  14.4  14.0  1.9
Came".  23.6  le0.9  16.7  46.7  23.1  24.5  23.1  1.7  10.6  7.4  3.6  3.2  1235  17.4  20.3  4.9
Ccntl  Afrkan  Repubic  13.6  11.4  9.9  *2.2  21.1  26.1  26.9  5,0  6.9  12.6  13.0  S.1  14.2  131  13.9  08
Como  35.1  23.4  25.5  *11.7  . 42.7  36.8  41.6  -5.Y  18.7  5.3  4.4  .11.4  23.9  32I5  38-3  7.6
Cote  olvolin  30.6  23.6  22.1  *7.0  36.9  37.1  35.7  0.1  10.0  3.5  3.3  4.  26.9  33.6  32.4  6.6
Gaibe  33.2  21.5  23.4  -11.7  32.9  29.1  27.4  .3.9  16.7  6.0  S.5  -10.7  6e.2  23.1  22.0  6.9
Gumbl,  4The  28.8  21.5  21.2  2.7  32.6  30.1  25.5  -2.6  12.4  10.4  9.0  -21.1  202  19.7  16.5  -1J5
ahana  L.  13.0  IL3  4.9  11.S  14.6  15.4  3.1  1.7  3.4  4.0  1.7  9.5  11.2  1.4  1.4
Kenya  23.3  23.1  23.3  .0.2  30.6  29.6  29.7  -1.0  7,1  6.15  6.4  .0.6  23.5  23.1  23.4  40.4
MaVdguar  12.3  13.2  11.3  0.7  38.9  12.2  11.1  417  6.6  7.7  7.5  1.1  12.3  10.3  10.9  *IJ
Malnwi  20.0  20.1  19.3  0.0  31.4  28.6  30.0  *2.9  0.7  6a3  6.0  -2.2  22.7  22.2  24.0  .0.6
Mill  1.38  I53  14.6  1.7  26.6  26.2  26.3  -.5  20.5  131.0  22.5  0.5  16.2  5.1  14.5  -1.0
MaurmanLa  22.1  23.7  22.0  1.6  27.3  25.9  23.3  *1.4  2.5  5.3  4.0  2.S  24.9  20.6  19.3  *4.3
Momambiu  21.7  21.9  24.7  0.2  37.9  48.3  54.2  10.4  13.8  23.4  26.9  9.6  24.1  24.9  27.3  0.3
141ger  11.4  9.3  8.3  -1.5  19.2  19.5  16.9  0.3  9.0  3.3  1.9  .5.7  10.3  26.2  13.0  6.0
I geria  13.1  16.3  19.2  3.7  18.9  24.3  28.0  5.4  9.5  5.7  3.2  .3.7  9.5  12.6  22.3  9.1
Rw  nn  12.0  12.5  12.3  0.5  19.1  24.1  27.7  S.0  8.2  3.2  1.6  0.0  20.9  15.8  19.1  4.9
S*tupi  318.4  18.0  19.1  40.4  25.4  20.4  19.4  -5.0  3.8  3.1  3.6  40.7  21.6  17.3  2s.3  -4.3
Srr  Lone  9.4  9.7  -12.2  0.3  22.5  20.6  21.7  *2.0  4.3  3.d  4.6  -0.7  18.2  17.0  17.8  *1.3
Tannia  IS.4  20.0  23.0  I.S  29.4  2S.7  25.3  *3.7  6.8  4.8  3.6  -2.0  2it  21.0  2L3  -1.7
Togo  28.3  21.9  17.1  4.2  35.1  28.3  22.3  4.8  10.7  7.4  5.0  -3.3  24.4  20.9  17.3  -3A4
S  Ugan  9.1  6.4  t.3  -2.6  15.1  13.7  18.5  -2.4  2.2  5.7  18.  3.6  12.9  7.9  9.7  -5.0
wZabia  23.1  17.7  16.8  -5.4  38.3  30.9  29.9  -7.4  4.9  5.6  7.4  0.6  33.4  25.3  22.4  .3.0
Zlimbab  19.9  35.4  35.S  5.5  40.0  45.7  44.9  S.7  6.0  3.3  S.5  2.1  34.1  37.6  36.4  3.5
Mean  23.9  17.5  17.4  *1.4  27.7  26.9  27.0  -0.8  8.9  7.4  7.3  -1.5  I8.  19.5  19.7  0.6
Maedan  38.4  17.3  17.0  -0.2  27.9  26.0  26.0  .1.2  8.9  6.2  5.7  40.7  17.9  18.0  138.2  0.6
CFA  Caunie
Mea  21.4  28.9  16.3  -4.5  29.2  26.3  25.5  .2.8  11.2  6.7  5.3  -4.1  I2.0  19.7  19.7  1.7
UM  IS.4  16.9  16.7  -A.4  21.5  26.1  23.3  -3.9  10.6  6.0  4.7  -5.3  16.2  1723  15.8  -0.8
Ngn-CFA  Countrks
UM  17.0  17.9  18.0  0.9  26.7  27.3  28.2  0.6  7.2  l.0  8.4  0.8  19.4  39.3  19.1  -0.1
Man=  18.4  17.7  19.2  0.5  27.3  25.9  27.7  -1.0  6.8  6.1  7.4  0.6  20.2  19.7  19.3  0.3
Sam:  IMF nd  Werld  Bank  Staff  estiw.generally measured  by seigniorage,  the revenue  from money  creation. 7 As a general rule, the larger the
seigniorage,  the greater the revenue  from money  creation, and the higher the rate of inflation,  particularly
in the long-mn. As a general rule, seigniorage  in excess of 1.5% of GDP is risky because  the economy
will  eventually  fall inLo  a high inflation  trap, and seigniorage  in excess of 3  % indicates  major
macroeconomic  imbalances  (Fischer  and Easterly, 1990).
26.  While there are close  links between  inflation  and seignorage,  they  don't always  move in
tandem, especially  in the short run.  In the short run seigniorage  may not be inflationary  if it
accommodates  an increase in the demand  for money, if it is mainly transitory,  or if there are lags in the
transmissions  of increases  in the money supply  to prices.  It is useful, threfore.  to consider  the rate of
inflation  along  with seigniorage  in assessing  whether  countries  have improved  their monetary  policies.
27.  Finally, real interest  rates are also a useful in understanding  the degree of tightness  of
monetary  policy. Positive  and very high real interest  rates tend to inhibit  economic  activity  excessively
while  large negative  real interest  rates are overly expansionary.-  In Africa,  for the mrst part, interest  rates
have limited  value as an indicator  of the tighmess  of monetary  policy  because  they are generallv  not
market determined,  fiancial markets  are chin  and the government  is usually  involved  in seing  die rates.
However, they convey  information  about  whether  monetary  policy is discouraging  savings,  through
in  rates that are too high and negative,  or discouraging  growth. through interest  rates that are too high
and positive. High rates discourage  borrowing  and can undermine  the financial  soundness  of banks, as
borrowers  have more difficulty  realizig  the high profits needed  to repay the high interest  rates.
28.  Chmnnles  in mnnnry  palicy.  Overall, the median rate of inflation  and level of seignorage
declined  slightly  in the second  half of the 1980s. However, there is much  variation  among  countries. The
improvement  in Ghana has been  notable:  though  it has only moved  from the extremely  high seigniorage
group in the early 1980s  to the high'seigniorage  group in the early  1990s,  the drop in the rate of inflation
was considerable. In contrast,  Nigeria  moved  from the moderate  group in the  pre-reform period to the
extreme  group more recently. Guinea-Bissau,  Mozambique,  Sierra-  Leone  and Zambia  experienced  an
acceleration  in the rate of inflation. These  countries  also had high levels  of seigniorage.
29.  As one would  expect, given  the fixed exchange  rate as a nominal  anchor, the CFA
countries  had very low rates of inflation  in the early 1980s  and saw a decline  in the rates of inflation  in the
late 1990s  as they attempted  to effect a real exchange  rate depreciation. These countries  also had very low
rates of seigniorage  during 1981-86  and by the 1987-92  period  had experienced  a large decline  in
seigniorage. The non-CFA  countries,  on the other hand, expeienced increases  in their rates of inflation
and seigniorage  as their govermnents  struggled  to finance  worsening  fiscal deficits.
7  While there are  didtrcnt  ways  of measurimg  seigniorage,  we use one that atmpts  to capture  the
irnatonary  impact-as  opposed  to the  total  revenue-o  pnnting  money.  The  measure  used  here  removes  the  seigniorage
associated  with  increases  in real  money  demand.  Thus  the dationary  impact  of  segniorage  is measured  as
s.  ACMd) 
where  M is nominal  money  Y is  nominal  GDP  and  is real GDP  grwth
-15-30.  M  ynnemry  plic.ys  czance. Despite  the improvements.  countries  have not been successful  in
putting  in place a set of monetary  policies  that yield price stability  and low real interest races. As shown in
table 6. many  countries in Sub-Saharan  Africa have inflation  rates that are moderately  higher  than
international  levels (between  10%  and 30%), and thus moderate levels  of seigniorage  (around 1.5% of
GDP). To assess the policy  stance, we classified  the countries  into four groups: low seigniorage  (less than
0.5% of GDP), moderate  (0.6% to 1.5% of GDP). high (1.6% to 3%). and extreme  (higher  than 3%).
As shown in table 7. all of the countries  with low seigniorage,  and most of the countries  with moderate
seigniorage,  are as expected,  countries  of the CFA Zone. Only  two of the non-CFA  countries  (The
Gambia  and  Mauritania)  had achieved  inflation  rates of less than 10%  by 1991-92. At the other extreme,
we find a few countries  (Tanzania.  Nigeria. Sierra Leone  and Zambia) that have large seigniorage  and
high inflation. Finally, in Sierra Leone  and Zambia,  two countries  that have had high seigniorage  through
most of the 1980s.  the situation  appears  to be out of control. Not surprisingly.  these countries  have
inflation  rates that are the highest  in the sample,  approaching  100%. on average, in the second  half of the
1980s.
31.  As inflation  rates came down in many countries.  high negative  real interest  rates were
reduced, as shown in Table 8.  Some countries.  however, notably  Nigeria. Sierra Leone  and Zambia, still
have substantially  negative  real interest  rates. reflecting  their continuing  high inflation  rates. In contast,
marny  countries  have high positive  real interest  rates (in excess of 3 percent in 1991-92).  with the majority
of them belonging  to the CFA zone. The high rates in these  countries  are a result of tight  monetary and
credit policies needed  to restrain aggregate  demand. to support  the fixed exchange  rate and to avoid  capital
outflows. Only a couple of countries  had real interest  rates  in the range of -3 to 3 percent, the range
considered  to be most conducive  to long-term  growth.'  One small  modification  was made in the scoring
real interest rates: in Adjiwtmnenr  in Africa real interest  rates were scored from 1(best)  to 3(worst),  we
changed  the scoring to 1 to 4 scale to be consistent  withdthe  other policy indexes. High negative  real
interest  rates exceeding  -15 percent were scored as 4.  This did not change  the classification  of the
countries  presented  in the original report.
Moving to the Policy  Frontier:  Overall Change in Macroeconomic  Policies.
32.  In this section  we bring together  the various indicators  that have been used  to track the
progress  countries  have made in adopting  sound  exchange  rate. fiscal and monetry policies  to create a
composite  index  measuring  how much  change  there has been  overall in the macroeconomic  policy stance.
It is based on the changes  in the three key policy indicators:  monetary, fiscal  and exchange  rate policies.
There are clear methodological  problems  in aggregating  these indicators  to assess  the change  in
macroeconomic  policies, since  theory  tells us very litde about  the relative weights  that should  be attached
Based  on cross-country  regression  results,  Easterly  (1993) finds  that  a dummy  for financial  repression,
defined  as real  interest  ratcs  below  of -5, had  a negative  and significant  impact on growth. Redefining  repression  as less
tdana -2 percent  real  rate  of interest  was  mt significant,  though  it had a negative  sign.  Te  WoThkldedelnpimenLRepozRt
1989  notes that  high and positive  interest  rates also are bad for growth.  However,  very  high and  positive  real interest
rates  are sometimes  a relatively  short-term  phenomenon  ca'used  by a rapid  decrease  in inflation  and thus are not always
an indicator  of major  policy  distortions.  Under  the assumption  that  high negative  rates impose  a greater  burden on growth
an high  positive  rates. we did not give a scorc of 4 (the worst ranking)  to countries with  high  positive  rates. rescrving
it instead  for countries  with  extremely  high  negative  real inrtrest rates.
-16-Table 6.  Solgniorage ai.d Inflation
Segniorage  Inflatlon
Average  Difference  between  Average  Difference  betveen
(Percentage  of UDP)  1981-86  and 1987-92  (Percent)  1981-86  and 1987-92
Country  1081-88  1987-92  1991-92  (percentage  points)  198186  1987-92  1991-92  (perCenmgepoins)
Benin  0.8  1.2  1.4  0.4  3.5  3.0  6.0  -0.5
Burkina  Faso  1.0  0.1  0.1  -0.9  6.2  0.1  0.3  -6.1
Burundl  0.9  -0.1  N  -1.0  7.7  7.3  6.7  -0.4
Cameroon  0.7  -0.2  -1.1  -1.0  9.6  -. 71  0.1  -10.4
Central  African  Rep.  1.0  -0.1  -0.3  -1.1  8.6  -2.3  -1.9  -11.0
Chad  1.8  1.3  -1.1  -3.1  3.2  0.7  -0.9  -2.4
Congo  0.1  0.7  0.7  0.7  9.8  2.8  8.6  -7.0
Cote  d'lvolre  1.1  -0.7  -0.5  -1.8  5.8  3.2  2.6  -2.6
Gabon  0.7  0.0  -0.7  -0.7  9.9  -0.8  -4.6  -10.7
Gambia,  The  1.8  1.4  1.9  -0.4  20.7  12.3  9.0  -8.4
Ghana  3.3  2.6  2.3  -0.6  56.0  27.0  14.0  -29.1
Guinea  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Gulnea-Bissau  N  5.1  3.5  N  40.5  72.8  72.5  32.4
Kenya  1.2  1.7  3.5  0.8  12.0  16.1  24.7  4.2
Madagascar  1.6  2.4  3.3  0.8  19.4  14.3  11.6  -5.1
Malawi  1.0  1.8  2.0  0.8  13.3  19.8  17.7  6.5
Mali  1.7  -0.8  0.4  -2.6  6.7  2.0  4.1  -4.7
Mauritania  1.9  1.4  1.1  -0.4  9.0  7.7,  9.7  -1.2
Mozambique  .NA  N  NA  NA  17.2  57.7  40.1  40.5
Niger  0.7  -0.4  -0.5  -1.1  6.0  4.0  -6.1  -10.0
NIgeria  1.1  3.2  5.0  2.1  17.4  30.2  28.8  12.8
Rwanda  0.2  0.4  1.4  0.1  5.3  6.9  14.6  1.6
Senegal  1.1  -0.5  0.1  -1.6  11.0  -1.2  -0.9  -12.2
Sierra  Leone  8.2  5.9  4.5  -0.3  57.1  92.5  84.1  35.3
Tanzania  3.4  5.7  NA  2.4  30.6  25.2  22.2  -5.4
Togo  1.8  .0.9  0.9  -2.7  6.5  0.3  0.9  -6.2
Uganda  NA  NA  NA  90.6  95.2  40.3  4.6
Zambla  3.6.  4.8  4.0  0.9  25.9  104.8  142.5  79.0
Zimbabwe  0.8  2.0  1.5  1.1  15.0  19.3  32.7  4.3
Mean  1.6  1.2  1.3  -0.4  1&7  21.9  20.6  3.1
Msdian  1.1  0.7  1.1  -0.4  10.5  7.5  9.4  -215
CFA  countres
Mean  1.0  -0.2  -0.0  -1.3  7.2  0.3  0.4  -7.0
Median  1.0  -0.3  -0.1  -1.1  6.6  0.2  0.2  -6.6
Non-CFA  countrles
Mean  2.1  2.5  2.8  0.5  27.3  38.1  35.7  10.7
MedIan  1.6  o.0  2.3  0.6  18.4  22.5  23.4  4.2
Note: Seiniorage  was  calculated  as  the change  In  Ml over  GDP  in  the share  of Ml to GDP  tme  the real  GDP  growth  rate.
Source:  World  Bank  amid  IMF, IFS  data  and  Aulhors'  Caloblatlone.Table 7.  Seigniorage and Inflation, 1991-92
Seigniorage  Inflaton
Country  (Percentage  of GDP)  (Percent)
Extreme  Seignorage  in 1991-92
Nigeria  5.0  28.8
Sierra  Leone  4.5  84.1
Zambia  4.0  142.5
Kenya  3.5  24.7
Guinea-Bissau  3.5  72.5
Madagascar  3.3  11.6
Mean  4.0  60.7
Median  3.8  50.7
High Seignorage  in 1991-92
Ghana  2.3  14.0
Malawi  2.0  17.7
Gambia,  The  1.9  9.0
Zimbabwe  1.5  32.7
Mean  1.9  18.4
Median  2.0  15.9
Moderate  Seignorage  in 1991-92
Benin  1.4  6.0
Rwanda  1.4  14.6
Mauritania  1.1  9.7
Togo  0.9  0.9
Congo  0.7  5.6
Mean  1.1  7.4
Median  1.1  6.0
Low  Seignorage  in 1991-92
Mali  0.4  4.1
Burkina  Faso  0.1  0.3
Senegal  0.1  -0.9
Central  Afncan  Rep  -0.3  -1.9
Niger  -0.5  -6.1
Cote  d'ivoire  -0.5  2.6
Gabon  -0.7  -4.6
Chad  -1.1  -0.9
Camercon  -1.1  0.1
Mean  -0.4  -0.8
Median  -0.5  -0.9
Note: Seigniorage  was  calculated  as  the  change  in Ml over  GDP
less  the  share  of Ml to GDP  times  the  real  GDP  growth  rate.
Source:  World  Bank  and  IMF,  IFS  data  and  Authors'  Calculations.
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(Percent)
Avages
Couan9ry  191e6  1987-92  199142
Zambiab-15.3  -42.1  -4-.3
Sbina Loone  -36.0  -27.1  -23.1
Ntg md  -5.9  -14.1  -22.7
MamSn  -3.7  -4.5  467
Maudhania  -3.2  -2.1  -4.4
Benin  4.6  2.4  -Z7
Rmndm  1.5  -(.9  -2.4
Mmli  2.2  ..7  3.1
Cato  CuIvlre  1.5  3.9  4.1
Gambla,  The  -9.8  3.8  4,9
Conoo  0.4  s.e  5.5
Upand  -. 4  A  114  7.0
Togo  4.0  6.3  7.2
Sengal  -1.7  7.1  7.8
Ghana  -16.4  -0.4  8.0
Busrlds  Faso  2.7  5.8  8.1
Cameomn  1.1  7.8  9.5
CentIl Ariman  Republic  1.9  9.3  9.7
Nigr  6.3  10.5  1Z4
Chad  5.6  5.5  13.8
Gabon  0.9  11.6  20.3
Burundi  -1.7  -3.0  -
Kenya  0.3  -to  -
Mdagascar  -4.8  -4.9  -
Tanzania  -20.1  -8.9  na
Zlnbabwe  -3.3  -5.0  na
SAln  -4.9  -1.C  a.5
Mde  -0.7  tO  £5
CPFAcounties
lmen  Z4  6.6.  Q2
Modest  2.0  Z  .0  7.9
Non-CFA  counti
Mean  -11.2  -. 7  -9.7
Moclin  -54  -4.7  -4.4
NOW  The  sea interest  rWAt  is  ScatLdted  as  (lth.  namirl
Insterst  ae las the  Noon  law  h the  foIwirng  year)
dhdad by (1  the  'San  in  the  fo  owirng year).
Soucc. IMF.  IFS  data  and  Aulhort Cakluak.to the various elements. How important  is low inflation  relative to a low foreign  exchange  rate premium?
Is a reduction  in inflativa  more or less important  than one in the  premium?  Are there significant  gains in
the overall policy  enviromnent  if the premium is reduced  to low levels  but inflation  remains high (say close
to three digits)? Are there any gains in reducing  inflation  from 20 percent to 5 percent if the domestic
currency  remains grossly  overvalued?  Does a reduction  in the budget  deficit by three percentage  points of
GDP have the same impact if the initial  deficit  is 15 percent of GDP as opposed  to 4 percent of GD!P?
33.  Although  no method  can address  these complex  questions  in a satisfactory  manner, we
began  by creating  an index  that (while  imperfect),  can at least  provide  a sense  of the change in
macroeconomic  policies since  the beginning  of the adjustment  period and that is consistent  across
countries.  Our approach  was to assign  munerical  values (from -3 to +3) based  on the size of the change in
each of the indicators  between 1981-86  and 1987-92.  For exchange  rate policy,  we used the change in the
real exchange  rate for the franc-zone  countries,  and an unweighted  average of the change  in the real
exchange  rate and the change in the premium for te  countries  widt flexible  exchange  rates. For monetary
policy,  we took the average of changes  in seigniorage  and in inflation  (an indicator  of the effectiveness  of
monetary policy).
9 For the fiscal balance, we use the change in the budget deficit before grants. because it
provides  a measure of the domestic  fiscal effort. We made one adjustment  to account  for changes  in
domestic  tax revenues  (the index  increased  [decreased]  by one point if revenues  rose [fell] by more dtan  3
percentage  points of GDP). Since  we do not have any compelling  reason a priori for giving  more weight  to
any of the three policies, we opted  for a unweighted  average, which  we then used  as the measure of
change in macroeconomic  policies.
34.  By and large, there has been improvement  in macromeconomic  policies (table  9), as
contries increased  external competitiveness  and reduced inflation. Seventeen  out of the twenty-six
countries  for which we were able to compute  the index  showed  improvement  in the macroeconomic
indicator  between 1981-86  and 1987-92. Six countries, Ghana.  The Gambia,  Burkina  Faso, Madagascar,
Tanznia and Zimbabwe  display  the largest  improve  N.  Nine counries show  a deterioration  in overall
macrconomic  policy, with Cote  d'Ivoire, Cameroon,  Gabon and Congo, Zambia  and Mozambique
exeriencing the largest declines  during the period. Incorporating  the 1992  data caused  two countries  to
shift categories:  Nigeria dropped  from the large improvement  to the small  improvement  category, while
Benin  fell frm  the small improvement  to the deterioration  or no change  category. (Annex  table A. 1).
Change  in Maroeconomic Poliicies  and Economic Performance
35.  The common  perception  about  adjsent  programs in Sub-Saharan  Africa is that policy
reforms have not been particularly  effective  in im  economic  performance. The problem  with this
perception  is that it tends to confound  the effects  of  the failure to implement  policy  reforms with the
effects of reforms that are acually  implemented. The recendy published Adjustment in Africa study,
however,  showed that countries  that actually  implemented  reforms, particularly  macroeconomic  policy
reforms, stopped  the decline  in income  and in some cases are expienced  positive  growth  for the first time
in many  years.  Further, countries  that  made only limited adjustment  efforts performed  poorly. This
section  of the paper extends  the work  undertaken  for the Adjustmenr in Afrir,  study  with the inclusion  of
9  The changc  in the  real  intrs  rate  was  not included  in the  index  of macroeconmic  policy  change
because  it is highly  correlated  with  the change  in infa.
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See Takble  M for  notes  enM  souroesdata for 1992  and reaches the same conclusions-namely,  that improving  policies pays off in a higher  rate
of growth.
Relating Changes In Policies  to Changes in Performance
36.  As in the AdjusunmntiAfrica report, we examine  whether  there has been  a change  in
economic  performance  between  the preadjustment  (defined  as 1981-86)  and the adjustment  period (1987-
92). and we relate  the change  in performance  to the change in macroeconomic  policy performance  index
developed  in the previous  section. In assessing  the impact  of policy  reforms, the primary focus is on the
change  in growth rate of real GDP per capita, not the level of growth.  The focus  on the change, and not
the level, is motivated  by the fact that raising Africa's per capita  growth rates to the level  of 4 or 5 percent
is a long-term. not a short-term,  process. Even  with good  policies,  growth rates in Africa in the medium
term are unlikely to attain  the rapid rates experienced  by the best performers elsewhere  in the world.
Historically  hfrica's growth  rates have lagged  behind  those of other regions, even after controlling  for
policies  and some  endowmenrs.  '°  Macroeconomic  and other  major policy changes  included  in adjustment
programs are not likely  to remove  deep-rooted impediments  to achieving  rapid growth  rates in the short
term though  they  may bring about  an increase in growth  rates fairly quickly. Over the long term, however,
the success  of development  efforts in Africa should  be judged  according  to whether  they achieve  the high
rates of growth needed  to alleviate  poverty within  a reasonable  time horizon.
37.  As was stressed  in the earlier study, we are examining  the payoff to policy  reform and not
to adjustment  lending. If reforms and the intensity  of adjustment  lending  (as measured  say, by the number
of adjustment  loans") were perfectly  correlated, there would  be no difference. But refonns and the
intensity  of adjustment  lending  do not always  go hand in hand for a variety of reasons: countries  do not
always implement  the reforms agreed  upon; they  may implement  reforms that are not elements  of
programs supported  by adjustment  loans;  the pace of reform may differ; or their may be a large shock
from weather or the terms of trade. The issue of the extent  to which  adjustment  lending  has facilitated
policy  reform in Africa is a complex  one which is beyond  the scope  of this paper.
Changes in Macroeconomic  Policies  and Real GDP per Capita Growth
38.  To assess the impact  of policy  reform on economic  performance,  we begin  by
investigating  the relationship  between  changes  in the index  of macroeconomic  policies  developed  in the
previous  section and the turnaround  in GDP growth. The simplest  approach  starts by dividing  countries
into  three groups, depending  on whether  they had large positive  changes  in the macroeconomic  policy
index, small  positive  changes,  or zero/negative  change  in the index. The mean and median of the rates of
growth and the turnaround  for each group is then  computed. As can  be seen from table 10, those countries
that improved  policies  the most (in the first group) had a median  growth turnaround  (of about  0.3
percentage  points), and they  retuned to positive  (though  very low)  rates of per capita  GDP growth. In
to  See  Easterly  and Levine  (1994).
For an analysis  of the relation  between  the  intensity  of adjustment  lending  and  growth  performance,
see  World  Bank  (1992).
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Real GOP  per Cap!ta growth rats  Real export growth  rate  Nominal InvestmenUGDOP  raUo
Average  Difference  Average  Difference  Difference
annual  growth  rates  between 19B1-86  annul  grogwth  rates  between 1981-88  Average  between 1981-4
(percent)  and 1987-92  (percent)  and 1987-92  percentage  of  GDP  and 1987-92
Country  1981-88  1987-92 (percentage  points)  1981-UB  1987-92 (percentage  points)  1981-86  1987-92  (percentage  points)
Large Improvement In Macroeconomfe Policy
Ghana  -2.4  1.3  3.7  4.6  13.5  9.0  8.3  14.3  8.0
Tanzania  -1.6  2.4  3.9  NA  NA  NA  15.3  37.1  18.8
Gambia,  The  0.7  -0.3  -1.0  -0.6  . . 11.3  11.9  I6.0  1i.t  -0.2
Burdina  Faso  2.2  -0.0  -2.2  -0.0  8.7  6.7  20.0  20.9  0.9
Madagascar  -3.7  -2.0  1.7  -7.3  6.0  12.3  9.1  12.2  3.1
Zimbabwe  0.4  -1.4  -1.8  8.0  -1.7  -9.7  19.6  21.4  1.8
Median  -0.8  -0.2  0.  I  -0.0  5.7  9.0  18.6  19.8  2.5
Mean  -0.7  -0.0  .7  0.9  8.8  5.9  15.4  20.8  5.4
StandardDeviaUion  j  52  t7  Z7.8  6.0  9.1  60  a8.  7.1
Niger  -4.7  -3.1  1.6  -7.1  -2.7  4.3  13.8  10.9  -2t9
Uganda  4.1  2.1  8.2  1.7  3.1  1.4  7.3  12.7  5.4
Burundl  2.1  1.0  -1.1  11.8  4.4  -7.4  18.4  17.7  1.4
Maurilania  -0.8  0.9  -0.3  7.7  -2.5  -10.3  31.9  22.7  -9.2
Nigerla  -4.8  2.2  6.8  -5.5  4.3  9.8  15.3  15.1  -0.2
MatavA  -1.4  -1.2  0.3  1.5  2.8  1.2  17.6  18.7  1.1
ts4  Mali  0.4  -0.6  -0.9  2.6  7.0  4.4  17.1  22.0  4.9
Senegal  0.4  -0.4  -0.8  8.1  1.3  -4.8  11.2  12.8  1.5
Kenya  -0.3  0.6  0.9  2.3  5.2  2.5  23.1  22.8  -0.3
Central  Afdcan Republic  -0.4  -2.8  -2.3  -3.6  -5.4  -1i8  11.0  12.2  1.1
Togo  -2.8  -3.4  -0.6  -0.2  -2.9  -2.7  25.3  23.6  -1.6
Median  -0.6  -0.6  -0.3  1.7  2.8  1.2  1  14  17.7  1.1
Mean  -1.4  -0.6  0.8  1.8  1.3  -0.3  17.3  17.4  0.1
Standard Deviaton  2.2  1.9  2.6  5.7  4.1  5.8  7.1  4.9  3.a
Benin  1.1  -1.2  -2.3  2.0  -1.3  -3.3  16.0  13.3  -2.
Rwanda  0.4  -2.7  -3.1  4.8  -1.4  -5.8  15.6  14.7  -0.9
Sierra Leone  -1.7  -0.3  1.4  -11.1  5.3  18.4  13.4  11.6  -1.9
Gabon  -2.7  -0.9  1.8  0.4  8.1  . 7.7  37.2  28.0  -9.3
Zambia  -2.9  -2.2  0.7  -2.2  0.2  2.5  17.2  13.7  -3.5
Mozambique  4,8  3.1  9.9  -13.5  10.7  24.2  15.8  35.2  15.6
Cameroon  4.8  -7.8  -12.3  13.7  5.7  -7.9  24.8  18.5  -8.4
Congo  4.6  -1.5  4.1  6.9  5.0  -0.9  39.4  17.5  -21.9
Cote d  Ivoire  -2.8  -4.8  -2.0  1.1  0.2  -0.9  17.1  10.9  -6.2
Mfedian  1-.7  -1.5  -2.0  1.1  A0  -0.9  17.1  14.7  -3.5
Mean  -0.7  -2.0  -1.3  0.1  3.6  3.5  21.9  18.1  -3.11
Standard Dewlalon  _38  3.0  .t1  8.4  4.4  10.7  98  8.2  10.5
Chad  5.8  1.8  -3.8  14.8  3.1  -11.7  5.9  8.9  3.0
Guinea  NA  0.7  NA  NA  2.5  NA  NA  16.3  NA
Gulnea-Bislau  3.0  2.2  -0.8  -4.4  17.1  2t1.  27.2  30.6  3.4
Note: ClassifIcatIon  ofounties  based  on TableA4.
Source:  World Bank data.contrast, countries  where policies  worsened  experienced  a deterioration  in growth  (of 2 percentage  points),
and over half of the countries  in that  group experienced  a severe decline  in per capita  income.
39.  Although  in aggregate  there is an association  between  the extent  of reform and changes  in
GDP growth. half  of the countries  in the sample  have policies  and growth  rates  moving  in the opposite
directions  (see Table 10 and figure  2). That is, an inprovement  (deterioration)  in the policy  stance  is
correlated  with a decline  (increase)  in the growth  rates. This suggests  that it is worth investigating  the role
of other  factors in addition  to policy, such  as the external  environment  and initial  economic  conditions,  in
determining  short-term  growth  outcomes. To control  for other factors,  we use a regression-based
approach. First, we control  for the initial  level of macroeconomic  distortion  and resource  endowments
(proxied  by average growth  rates in the preadjustment  period)  to eliminate  the  rebound  effect  - a country
with highly  distorted  policy environment  might  respond  more strongly  to the same  level of policy  change
than  a country  with a less distorted  policy  enviromnent  because  of greater  underutilized  capacity.  Second,
the impact  of the external  enviromnent  on growth  is controlled  for by the inclusion  of variables  to capture
the impact  of changes  in net external  transfers  and in the income  terms of trade. Third, we control  for
changes  in the regulatory  environment  by the inclusion  of a variable  that rneasures  the extent  of
government  control  of kcy prices  and product  markets.' 2 It awards  a high score  to countries  that
decontrolled  virtually  all of their  prices, eliminated  key monopolies  in the petroleum  seLtor  and in the
distribution  of key imported  consumer  goods  and fertilizer, and took steps  to liberalize  marketing  of key
agricultural  exports. This variable  is a very imperfect  proxy  for changes  in microeconomic  policies  that
may have affected growth by reducing supply-side constraints, bur it attempts to measure the extent to
which goverunent controls  on pricing  and marketing  of goods  that are of major importance  to the
economy  were relaxed.
40.  Controlling  for the effects  of external  transfers, regulatory  policies  and initial  conditions,
we then see whether  a positive  growth  mrnaround  is correlated  with improvements  in the macroeconomic
policies. Five regressions  are presented  in table 1I1  showing  the impact  of changes  in policies  and in the
other variables. The main  difference  across  regressions  is the choice  of policy  indicators.  Regression  I
shows  the results for the turnaround  in growth  using  the composite  indicator  of the change  in overall
macroeconomic  policy  shown  in table 10. We find that the coefnfcient  on the change  in the overall  policy
index  is positive  and significant. While  net transfers  and terms of trade are not statistically  significant  both
have the right sign. Regression  II shows  the results  using the individual  scores  for each of the three key
macroeconomic  policies.  The exchange  rate policy  and fiscal  policy  variables  have the right signs  and are
statistically  significant,  but the monetary  policy  variable  is not statistically  sigaificant. The coefficients  for
the terms  of trade and external  transfers  are also not staistically significant. In regressions  m-V only one
policy  score is included  in each  regression  along  with the other variables. The  coefficients  for the
exchange  rate and fiscal policy  remain  significant  with the correct sign, but monetary  policy  remains
12  The  counties were  scored  on  the  basis  of the  inforation in Tables  A.12andA.13  inAdjustirnen  in
Africn.  One point  was  given  for each  category  that  a country  improved.  In addition,  countries  that  reached  the  light
intervention  category  were awarded  an extra point, reflecting  the strong inccative  effects of  significandy  reducing
intervention. Thus, counes  that moved  from heavy to light intervention  were rated as 3, from medium  to light
intervention  as 2, and from heavy  to mediwu  intervention  as 1.
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aC  in  m 04-~~~~~~-5Table 11. Explaining  the Change  In GDP  per Capita  Growth
Dependent  variable:  Difference  In  real  GDP  per  Capita  growth  between  1981-86  and 1987-92
Chanaes In:
Overall  Exchange  Average
Macro  Rate  Monetary  Fiscal  Not  Terms  of  GDP
Policy  Policy  Policy  Policy  Transfer  Trade  Micro  Growth  Adjusted
constant  (Score)  (Score)  (Score)  (Score)  Shock  Shock  Policies  In  1981-86  RA2
I  -2.93  2.18  0.24  0.28  0.74  -0.94  0.88
(-4.76)  (4.27)  (1.47)  (1.50)  (1.81)  (-6.20)
11  -2A8  0.84  0.19  0.60  0.20  0.22  0.56  .0.88  0.90
(-3.31)  (2.98)  (0.45)  (2.78)  (1.18)  (1.1fi)  (1.26)  (.5.45)
III  -2.33  0.92  0.03  0.12  0.78  -0.86  0.85
(.3.60)  (3.18)  (0.21)  (0.62)  (1.69)  (-4.67)
IV  -1.03  -0.76  -0.22  *0.08  0:36  -1.10  0.79
(-1.19)  (-1.55)  (-1.27)  (-0.33)  (0.63)  (-5.73)
V  -1.77  0.68  0.02  0.10  0.37  -1.12  0.84
(-2.76)  (2.88)  (0.10)  (0.49)  (0.76)  (-6.64)
Note: Numbers  in parentheaes  are  t-statistlcs.  Macroeconomic  polcy scores  are from  table  A4. A dummy  variable  for  Mozambique  was  used  In  all the regresslons.statistically  insignificant  and changes  sign  when it is the only policy  variable  in the equation.' 3 In all five
regressions,  the significance  of the initial  growth  rate is robust  and has a negative  coefficient,  indicating  a
strong rebound  effect. The micro policy  variable  is significant  at the 10  percent  level in the first
regression, suggesting  that it might  be worth  investigating  alternative  methods  that better capture important
supply-side  policy  changes.
41.  Neither the terms  of trade nor the external  transfers  shock  variables  are statistically
significant,  though  they have  positive  signs  in all the regressions  except  where monetary  policy is the only
policy  variable. The greater stability  of the terms  of trade variable  in this paper relative  to the earlier
study reflects  a modification  to the way in which  we calculated  the shock  variables. There is no commonly
accepted  method  for calculating  changes  in the terms  of trade. In this paper, the method  we use is similar
to the one used in Easterly  et al (1993)  in their.  analysis  of the factors  explaining  differences  across
countries  in growth  rates over ten year periods. They  calculated  the terms  of trade variable  as the average
rate of change  of the income  terms  of trade for the decade  under study,  the assumpdon  being  that the faster
the growdt  in the terms of trade, the higher  a country's  GDP growth  rate should  be.  We used a similar
approach  in this paper, which  consisted  of calculating  the change  in the rate of growth  of the terms  of trade
in the  two periods  under study  (1981-86  and 1987-92).14  This way of calcUlat  the  terms of tade dfiffers
from the method used in AdjiiLctment  in Africa, which took the difference between the average terms of
trade index  for the  two periods. The assumption  underlying  this specification  of the terms of trade variable
is that an improvement  in the level of the terms  of trade from the first period (1981-86)  to the second
(1987-91)  rather than  a change  in the rate of growth  of the index  should  be reflected  in a change  in the rate
of GDP growth  between  the two  periods. We also redid  the regressions  using  this methodology.  While
the coefficients  are slighdy  different, the results  are essentially  the same. Judgements  about  how to define
the terms of trade variable  depend  in part about  hypotheses  about  the lagged  effect of changes  in the terms
of trade on changes  in GDP growth  rates.
42.  As shown  in figure 2 - the  partal scatter  diagram  of the change  in macroeconomic  policy
and the change  in GDP per capita  growth  - the direction  of the policy  change  is consistent  with that of
economic  performance  in 20 of the 26 countries  included  in the regression. After controUing  for other
factors,  the six countries  which do not follow  the predicted  relationship  are Bein,  Burundi,  The Gambia,
Kerr  Madagascar  and Togo. Benin,  Burundi  and Kenya had a negative  policy  residual  and a positive
growth  residuaL  while The Gambia,  Madagascar  and Togo had a positive  policy  residual  and a negative
13  The lack of significance  of the monetay policy  variable  may reflect  the  fact that the CPA counties
tended  to  score  wel on inflaio, as  ted given  their  attmpt  to  bnng about  a real  depreciation  thrugh tight monetary
policy. However,  tight  meay  polcy did  not bring  about a real depreciation  quicldy,  and hence  growth slffeired. The
non-CFA  coures  did achie  a real  depreciation,  with  some  countries  also  showing  signficant improvement  in iflation
while  others  made  less  progress  m  combatting  inflation. Often  the exchange  rate changes  in the non-CFA  countries  were
of such large magnitude  and so important  in restoring  icentives that  they were sufficient  to put the ecnomies on a
recovery  path,  even  though  moitay  and  fiscal  policy  did not always  show  large improvements.  Hence  there is no clear
correlation  between  monetay policy and growth outcomes. This result is mirrored  in other work, which finds dtat
inflation  tends not to be higbly significant  variable in cross-country  growth regressions  based on decade averages.
However,  there  is a strong  correlation  between  periods  of high  inflation  and low  economic  growLh  (Bruno  and Easterly,
work in progress)-
See ables  B.12  and  B.13  for  the  defimition  ofen tmsof  rad and net transfer  shoclL The regression
also  included  a intetve  durnny  for Mozambique  net  transfers. Mozambique  experienced  a huge negative  net transfers
shock  between  1981-86  and 1987-92.
-27-growth  residual. It is not clear what  other factors  might  explain  the performance  of these  particular
countries.
Change in Macroeconomic  Policies  and the Ratio of Gross Investment to GDP
43.  While  adjustment  policies  are instrumenal  in generating  the conditions  for higher  growth,
they  are only part of the solution.  Shifting  African  economies  onto a new growth  path requires  a
combination  of a good  overall  policy  environment  and improvements  in traditional  development
instruments,  such as investments  in education  and infrastructure. As many  studies  have  discovered,
however, investmnent  generally  responds  slowly  to adjustment  programs. This slow  response  is
understandable. Fiscal  stabilization  often  requires  that governments  cut some  public investment,  although
as we have seen, a number  of countries  (especially  those  outside  the CFA franc zone)  actually  increased
their level  of public investrnent  during  the adjustment  period. More importantly, private investment  is
unlikely  to increase in the early phase of adjustment  as the private sector  often  takes  a wait-and-see  aitude
due to the irreversibility  of investment  decisions  and the  reversibility  of key policy changes  (Serven  and
Solirano, 1993).
44.  As with GDP growth.  changes  in investment  performance  were related  to changes  in
macro-policies. On average, investment  increased  in countries  dtat improved  policies  while it declined  in
those  where policies  deteriorated,  and this is confirmed  by regression  analysis. The investment
performance  of certain countries  is notable. Tanzania  and Mozambique  had a remarkable  bmrnaround  in
investment  while  the oil-exporting  countries-Gabon,  Cameroon  and Congo-experienced  large  declines in
their investment  ratios. The decline  in investment  in these  latter countries  is understdable  given  the high
-and  often  unproductive-levels  of investment  that:  occurred  in the late 1970s/early  1980s  in response  to
the spike in oil prices.
45.  In the two groups  of countries  where policies  improved,  two-thirds  of the countries
experienced  an improvement  in investment  performance,  while  in the group of countrias  where
macroeconomic  policies  deteriorated  only Mozambique,  recovering  from a war and benefitting  heavily
from donor assistance,  experienced  a positive  turnaround  in investment.  One interpretation  of these results
is that  while better policies  may not always  succeed  in raising  investment  in the short-term, a deterioration
in the macroeconomic  policy  environment  will certainly  result in a decline  of investment.  The positive
relation  between  improving  policies  and higher investment  rates is confirmed  in regression  A, shown  in
Table 12.
Cbange  in Macroeconomic  Polcies and Real Export Growth
46.  Because  macroeconomic  incentives  have  a key role in export  performance  it is natural  to
relate  our index  of changes  in macroeconomic  policies  to changes  in export  growth. Thus, the final
indicator  of economic  performance  examined  in this paper  is real export  growth. Africa's export
performance  before adjustment  was poor. Between  1965  and 1986  real exports  from Sub-Saharan  Africa
merely doubled,  while those of non-African  adjusting  countries  increased  fivefold.  Between  1987  and 1992
exports in the African adjusting  countries  were growing  at 3.5 percent  per year compared  with 9.2 percent
in other  developing  countries.  While the export  growth  performance  has improved  relative  to the past
(real exports  grew at 1-3  % percent  per year between  1970  and 1986),  there is still room for improvement
-28-Table  12. Explaining  the  Change  in Exports  and Investment
Changes  in:
Overall  Average
Macro  Net  Terms  of  real  export
Policy  Transfer  Trade  Micro  Growth  Adjusted
constant  (Score)  Shock  Shock  Policies  In 1981-86  RA2
Dependent  variable:  Difference  In Investment/GDP  ratio  between  1981-8B  and 1987-92
A  4.08  4.55  0.09  -0.24  -0.08  -0.36  0.77
(1.24)  (2.30)  (0.23)  (-0.51)  (-0.12)  (-2.23)
Dependent  variable:  Difference  in real  export  growth  between  1981-86  and 1987-92
a  0.85  1.02  -0.41  0.24  2.08  -0.77  0.82
(0.41)  (0.85)  (-0.97)  (0.47)  (1.93)  (-4.15)
Note: Numbers  in  parentheses  are  t-statistics.  Macroeconomic  policy  score  is from  table  A4.
A dummy  variable  for Mozambique  was  also  used  in both  regressions.47.  Exports  are expected  to expand  in the  early phase of adjusunent  programs,  especially
because  successful  programs  increase  external  competitiveness  and rely on export  growth  to offset the
output  costs  associated  with stabilization  efforts. As is shown  in Table 10, countries  with the largest
improvements  in macroeconomic  policies  enjoyed  higher  growth  rates of exports  than otlwr adjusting
countries  in the region  and had the largest  positive  turnaround  in export  growth. In contrast,  based on the
medians,  exports  lost ground in those countries  where macroeconomic  policies  deteriorated,  though  there
were large increases  in Sierra Leone  and Mozambique,  and also in Gabon (from oil).  Regression  shown
in tble  12 relates the  changes  in policy  index  to changes  in real exports  contolling for terms of trade and
the initial  level of export  growth. It shows  that the  macroeconomic  policy  variable  is not significant
(though  it has a positive  sign), with the rebound  effect  being  by far the most significant  variable. What is
interesting  is that the micropolicy  change  variable  is significant.  suggesting  that liberalization  has played
some role in export  expansion. One reason that the macroeconomic  policy change  variable  may not be
significant  is that it is overwhelmed  by the huge variance  in export  performance  that reflect  country-
specific  changes  in the performance  of a major  export  not related  to macroeconomic  policies  per se (such
as the discovery  of a new oil field).
Still  Far From the Frontier:  Overal Macroeconomic  Poliy Stance
48.  How close  are countries  to the policy  frontier? To answer this question,  we developed  a
second  indicator  in Adjnutmenr  in Africa to capture  the current  macroeconomic  policy stance,  a useful
complement  to the change  in policies indx.  A country  can  show substtial  positive  change  in its
macroeconomic  policies,  yet still  have a long ways  to go before  achieving  good macroeconomic  policy.
Madagascar,  for example,  improved  its macroeconomic  policies  but still  has a relatively  poor policy stance
because  it started  from a very unstable  situation.
49.  To derive the  indicator  of policy  stance  as of 1991-92,  we classify  the fiscal, monetary
and exchange  rate policy  stance  as adequate  (or good),  fair, poor, or very poor by assigning  each policy
area a numerical  value  from 1 to 4 with the larger  number  indicating  poorer policies. Tables 13-15
summarize  the rankings  of fiscal, monetary  and exchange  rate stance  in 1990-91  (revised  data) and 1991-
92 (revised  data). The tables show  that the fiscal  and exchange  rate policy  stance  deteriorated  in a number
of countries.
50.  The  overall score for the macroeconomic  policy  stance  was obtained  by a simple  average
of the three policy  scores  (see table 16 for details). For fiscal  policy,  we used the budget  deficit  inc.luding
grants, because  it provides  a better measure  of the  current fiscal  imbalances-implicitly  we assune that
graus will continue  at the  same level in the short  term. For monetary  policy,  we relied on seigniorage,
inflation,  and the real interest  rate. And for exchange  rate we used  the premium  on the parallel  exchange
rate for the countries  without  convertible  currencies  and the measure  of misalignment  based  on the REER
described  in para. 16 for the countries  in the franc zone. Again,  the choice  of cutoff  points is unavoidably
arbitrary, since  there is no solid  analytical  basis for differeniating  sharpLy  between  poor and very poor
policy  stances,  or between  adequate  and fair. For example,  there probably  is little  difference  in the
macroeconomic  policy  environment  i  the Central  African  Republic  and C6te  d'Ivoire, but a small
difference  in exchange  rate policy  (according  to our measure)  gives  C6te d'lvoire a worse overall  score,
enough  to place COte  d'lvoire in the very poor group  and the Central  African  Republic  in the poor group.
In our view, the difference  is not that large. The labels-adequate,  fair, poor and very poor-provide a
useful basis for classiflying  countries  relative  to inernational  standards,  but too much weight  should  not be
attached  to the precise rankings.
-30-Table 13. Fiscal Policy Stance,  1990-91  and 1991-92
(based  on  revised  data)
1990-91  1991-92
Good or Adequate Fiscal Policy Stance





Fair Fiscal Policy Stance




Poor Fiscal  Policy Stance
Benin  Benin











Very Poor Fiscal Policy Stance
Cameroon  *  Cameroon  *
Central  African  Republic  *  Central  African  Republic
Congo  Congo
Cote  d'lvoire  *  Cote  d'lvoire
Mozambique  *  Malawi  *
Sierra  Leone  Nigeria  *
Zambia  *  Rwanda  *
Zimbabwe  *  Zimbabwe  *
A score  of 1 is considered  good  or  adequate;  2, fair;  3, poor;  and  4. very  poor.  -
Source:  Tables  A7  and  A8.
-31-Table 14. Monetary  Policy Stance,  1990-91  and 1991-92
(based  on  revised  data)
1990-91  1991-92
Good  or Adequate  Monetary  Policy Stance
Burkina  Faso  Benin
Burundi  Burundi
Congo  Cote  d'lvoire
Cote  d'lvoire  Mall
Mali
Fair  Monetary  Policy Stance
Benin  Burkina  Faso
Cameroon  Cameroon
Central  African  Republic  Central  African  Republic
Gabon  Congo
The  Gambia  Gabon








Poor Monetary Policy Stance





Zimbabwe  Zi**  mbabwe
Very  Poor Monetary  Policy  Stance
Sierra  Leone  Nigeria  *
Zambia  Sierra  Leone  - *
Zambia  *
A score  of 1.0  to 1.3  is  considered  good  or  adequate;  1.4  to 2.3,  fair;  2.4  to 3.0,  poor;
and  3.1  and  above,  very  poor.
Source:  Tables  A7  and  A8.
-32-Table 15. Exchange  Rate  Policy Stance,  1990-91  and 1991-92
(based  on revised  data)
1990-91  1991-92
Good orAdequate  Exchange Rate Policy Stance
Ghana  Ghana
Kenya  Mozambique
The Gambia  The Gambia
Fair Exchange  Rate Policy  Stance







Poor Exchange Rate Policy Stance
Benin  **  Benin
Burkina  Faso  Burkina  Faso
Central  Af*ican  Rep..  Burundi









Very Poor Exchange Rate Policy Stance
Cameroon  *  Cameroon  *
Congo  Congo  *
Cote  d'lvoire  *  Cote  d'lvoire  *
Mauritania  *  Kenya
Senegal  Mauritania  *
Sierra  Leone  Rwanda
Tanzania  Senegal
Zambia  Sierra  Leone  0
A score of 1 is considered  good  or adequate;  2, fair, 3, poor, and  4, very poor-
Source:  Tables  A7 and  AB.
-33-Table  16. Components  of Macroeconomic  Policy  Stance,  1991.92
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baancea  ndudng |  policy  Se  lonrane  Infatson  Reald  Intest  rula  poicy  cadangrate  alfecveexchtla  le  nD  poky
Cotntry  grunts  of GDP)  j  so  ]  Perewl  Scar  Percent  Score  Pent  Scwor  mare  I  pkyuce  195  score  Casihi
Ad"ua  UsmccenomcPokY  S#nca
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PaIr  WacroeconomIc  Polkey Sfanc
Tanzanta  0.8  7.6  ma  22.2  2.0  2  2.0  45.2  3.0  20  t0  Tatza
ugdne  FAo  -2.7  2.0  0.1  1.0  0.3  1,0  9.1  3.0  o.?  14.9  3.0  30  2o2  ow*ae Feo
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Madgascr  .8.0  3.0  3.3  4.0  1S16  2.0  M  ma  3.0  19.1  2-0  20  2.7  11dega
I  Tgo  46  3.0  090  2.0  00  1.0  7.2  3.0  2t0  10.0  30  3.0  327  |Toga
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Souea Tue  AS.51.  While  the majority  of the countries  in the sample  group  had improvements  in overall
macroeconomic  policies  in the 1987-92  period  compared  with the earlier  1981-86  period,  over half of the
countries  in our sample  still had a poor macroeconomic  policy  stance  in the 1991-92  period  (16 of the 26
countries  classified  had  poor or very poor macroeconomic  policies). Of the 10  countries  with  better
macroeconomic  policies,  only  The Gambia  is  classified  as having  good  or adequate  macroeconomic
policies. It is important  to note  that  the change  in the relative  rankings  in Ghana  and The Gambia  are due
to data revisions. in Adjiistment in Africa, Ghana  was  the only  country  ranked  as having  a good  or
adequate macroeconomic  policy into  the good  or adequate  category. It falls  down  a category  due L.
revisions  in the budget  data, while  The Gambia  improves  because  of a correction  to the  black  market
premium  data. The  budget  dama-for  Ghana  were revised  to reflect  the broad definition  of the budget
deficit,  which  includes  donor  financed  capital  expenditure  to improve  the comparability  with other
countries. Nine  countries,  including  Ghana,  were classified  as having  only  fair macroeconomic  policies
for the period 1991-92.
52.  Few  of the African  countries  come  close  to the sustained  track record  of the best
performers  among  developing  countries  outside  the region  (e.g. Chile, Malaysia,  Mexico  and Thailand).
Even in Ghana,  a country  often  considered  to be a front rAnner  in the adjustment  process  in Africa,  the
fiscal balance  is fragile,  inflation  is above  international  levels,  and the black  market  foreign  exchange
premiumn  has not been elixninated.  Even  more  disturbing  is the fact that the  average  macroeconomic  policy
stance in 1991-92  deteriorated  from the  policy  stance  computed  for 1990-91,  using  in both cases  the
revised  data set for both  periods  to make  the comparison  (table 17). In 1990-91,  thirteen  courntries  were
classified  as having  poor  or very poor macroeconomic  policies,  whereas  by 1991-92,  sixteen  countries
classified  as poor or very poor. Five countries  (Kenya,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mali,  and Togo ) fell from
fair to poor or very poor, primarily  due to a deterioration  in their  fiscal and  exchange  rate policies.
Nigeria,  Rwanda,  and Zimbabwe  dropped  from poor  to very poor. Only  two countries  moved  up:
Burkdna  Faso  and Mozambique.  Malawi's  drop from fair to very poor is partally explained  by the
drought  in Southern  Africa  and the large decline  in donor  assistance  in 1992. The  drought  led to a large
fal in GDP and higher  expenditures  for food, both of which  contributed  to a substantial  decline  in the
overall fiscal  deficit  as a share of GDP . The  drought  also undermined  some  of the  policy  improvement
efforts  made by a few of the  other  coumtries.  Zimbabwe.  for example,  was  also strongly  affected  by the
drought. While  weather  is clearly  one factor  that explains  some  of the deterioration,  it is only one factor.
As of 1992,  there had been  no real turnaround  on the  policy  stance.  showing  how  difficult  the reform
process  is and how easily  its is derailed  or undermined  by external  and irnal  factors.
53.  The indicator  of overall  macroeconomic  policy  stance  gives  equal  weight  to the indicators
of exchange  rate, monetary  and fiscal  policy  stance. However,  the information  from cross-country
regressions  may provide  some guidance  as to what  may be a more  appropriate  set of weights. According
to the regression  presented  in Table 11, the index  of exchange  rate policy  has the largest  coefficient.
followed  by fiscal  policy,  with the coefficien  of the monetary  policy  index  much  smaller  and far less
significant. Although  the coefflicients  relate  to the impact  of the change  in policy  rather than  to the policy
stance  per se, they represent  a useful  starting  point  for constucting  a more  appropriate  set of weights.
According  to the regression,  exchange  rate policy  would  carry a weight  of 51.5 percent, fiscal  policy 36.7
percent,  and monetary  policy 11.8  percent.  Table 18 shows  how  countries  rank using  the set of weights
derived  from  the regressions-  Based  on the 1991-92  data, changing  the weights  causes  six countries  to
shift  category:  four (Burlina Faso,  Burundi.  Mauritania,  and Senegal)  drop  from fair to poor, and Central
African  Republic  from poor to very poor.  Recomputing  the stance  with  the regression-based  weights  for
1990-91  and comparing  it to the 1991-92  index  computed  in the same  manner  also shows  that there has
-35-Table  17. Overall  Macroeconomic  Policy Stance,  1990-91  and 1991-92
From  Adjustment  in  Aifde data  Based  on revid  data
1  - 199091  1 
Adequate  Macroeconomk  Policy  Stance
Ghana  The  Gambia  W"  The  Gambia
Fair Macroeconomic  Policy Stance
Burldna  Faso  Burundi  Budcina  Faso
Burundi  Ghana  -utundl
Gabon  Kenya  Ghana
Kenya  Madagiascar  Mautania
Madagascar  Malawi  MoEambiqua
Malawl  Mali  Niger
Mall  Mauritania  S  anegl
Mauritania  Niger  Tanzafia
Nrgeria  *^  Senegal  Uganda
Senegal  Tanzania




Poor  Macroeconomk  Pollcy  Stance
Benin  Benin  Benin 
Cenial  African  Republc  Burkina  Faso  CentWdArcan  Repxec
Niger  Central  Afrkan  Republic  *  Gabon
Rwanda  Gabon  Madagascar
Tanzanla  Nigeria  Mau
Zimbabwe  Rwanda  Togo
Zimbabwe
Very  Poor  Macroeconomic  Policy  Stance
Cameron  '  Congo  *  Camoroon
Congo  Cote  d'lvdre  Congo
Cote  dcivoire  Cameroon  Cote Noihe
Mozambique  Mozambique  K  Kenya
Sierra  Leone  Serra  Leonea  . .*  Ma





Notes:  The  narrow  defiption  of the  fiscal  deficit  was  used  in the  Adjustnent  In  Akica  study  for  Ghana
Source:  Tabbe  AS,  A7  and  ASTable 18. Overall  Macroeconomic  Policy Stance  Using Dlfferent  Weights
Policy Indax'using  Policy  Index  using  Policy Index  using
original  equal  weights  regression  based  weights  regression  based  weights
(Revised  data,  1991.92  stance)  (Revised  data,  1991-92  stance)  (ReviBed  data,  193G-91  stance)
Ado  quate  macrooconomkc  policy stance
The  Gambia  The  Gambia  The  Gambia
Fair  macrosconomIc  policy stance
Burkina  Faso  *  Ghana  Burundi
Bunundi  Mozambique  Ghana
Ghana  Niger  *  Kenya
Mauritanla  Tanzania  Madagascar





Poor  macroeconomIc  policy stanee
w3  Bonin  f*  Benin  Benin
*  Central  African  Republic  Durkina  Faso  Burkina  Faso
Gabon  Burundi  Gabon
Madagascar  Gabon  Maii
Mall  Madagascar  Maurilania






Vary  Poor  macroeconomic  policy stance
Cameroon  6  Cameroon  Cameroon
Congo  Central  African  Republic  Central  Afncan  Republic
Cole  divoire  Congo  Congo
Kenya  Cote  dIlvolre  Cole  dilvoire
Malawi  Kenya  Mozambique
Nigeria  Malawi  Sierra  Leone
Rwanda  *  Nigeria  Zambia
Sierra  Leone  Rwanda
Zambia  Sierra  Leone
Zimbabwe  Zambia
Zimbabwe
Note: Policy  ranking  based  on  fiscal  monetary  and  excxange  rate  poilcy  scores  reported  in table  AB
The  regression  based  weights  are  38.7%  weight  for  fiscal  policy  a 11.8  %  weight  for  monetary  policy
and  a 61.6%  weight  for  exchange  rate  policy.  These  weights  are  derived  from  regression  11  In  table  11.been a deterioration  in country policy  performance. Four countries  (Burundi,  Kenya, Madagascar,  and
Malawi)  drop from the fair category  to the poor or very poor category, while  two countries  (Mozambique
and Tanzania) move up from poor or very poor to the fair category. Three countries  (Nigeria, Rwanda
and Zimbabwe)  drop from poor to very poor.  Three countries  shift categories  in the equally weighted
index  that do not shift categories  in the regression-weighted  index,  while  two countries shift categories  in
the regression-weighted  index  and act in the equally  weighted  index. Seven countries  shift in both indexes.
Clearly the weighing  scheme  does make a difference  for a few countries.  but the general trend is the same
for both.
54.  We can also use the regression-based  weight  to reweight  the index  of macroeconomic
policy  change  (table 19). Five countries  would  change  categories:  Nigeria and Uganda would  move  from
the small to the large improvement  category  and three countries  would  move from the deterioration
category to the small improvement  category (Mozambique,  Rwanda  and Sierra Leone). However, two
countries  (Central African Republic  and Senegal)  would  show a deterioration  in policies. The weightng
scheme  provides  a slightly  more positive  view of the extent  of policy  change, but it does not, of course,
change  the results of Regressions  1I-V  (presented  in table 11)  relating  macroeconomic  policy changes  to
growth, since the regression  coefficients  were derived  by regressing  the indexes  of exchange  rate, fiscal
and monetary policy  changes  on the change  in GDP growth.
Conclusion
55.  These results demonstrate  that getting  the real exchange  rate right and reducing  the fiscal
deficit  to close  to zero should  be the top priority for restoring  growth.  Countries  that significantly  reduced
the black market premium (by devaluing),  and reduced  their budget  deficits enjoyed  the biggest  payoffs.
It is important  to point out that these two policies  need not be inconsistent: there is a posidve correltion
between improvements  in exchange  rate policy  and fiscal  poLicies  as the contrasting  experience  of the CFA
and non CFA countries  during the period 1987-92  also demonstrates. In this light, the devaluation  of the
CFA franc in January 1994  represents  a real opportunity  for the CFA fianc zone countries  not only to
improve  their fiscal performance,  but also, and even more importanly, to restore growth.
56.  Having  made real progress on the exchange  rate front, counwtries  need to focus their
reform efforts on sustining the progress  made ths  far, and in particular  to pay increased attention  to
improving  their fiscal position. The budget  deficit is stll unsustainably  high in many countries-around 9.8
percent of GDP in 1991-92-and grants still play a large  role.  The challenge  will be to reduce the budget
deficit in ways  that are consistent  with poverty  reducing  growth: hence the need to focus on reorientizg
public expenditures  to the essential  tasks of government,  especially  that of insuring  the provision  of basic
social services.  Two areas of concern that are not immediately  apparent  are implicit subsidies  to public
enterprises,  which continue  to be large in the few counties for which such data are available,  and costs of
banking  sector  restrurtuings that ultimately  are absorbed  by the budget. Reform in these areas are likely
to be imporant to ensuring  the long-term  susainabiliry  of the fiscal  reform efforts.
57.  Policy  reforms undertaken  thus far have  paid off in raising growth  rates.  But the level of
growth  is still too low to sustain  rapid rates of poverty  reduction. The increase  in growth thus far seems to
have come largely from more efficient  utlization of existing  capacity,  rather than from new investment.
The challenge  for countries  is to persist with the reforms implemented  to dare and to continue  to advance
towards  the policy frontier. This will enhance  the credibility  of the reform process and help to convince
-38-Table 19. Change  in Overall Macroeconomic  Policy,
1981-86  to 1987-92  Using Different Weights
Policy index using  Policy Index using
original  equal  weights  regression  based  weights
Large Improvement In Overall Macroeconomic Policy
Ghana  1.8  Tanzania  2.6
Tanzania  1.8  Ghana  2.1
Gambia,  The  1.5  Gambia,  The  1.7
Burkina  Faso  1.3  Nigeria  1.7
Madagascar  1.2  Zimbabwe  1.6
Zmbabwe  1.0  Madagascar  1.5
Uganda  .1.3
Burikna  Faso  1.2
Small Improvement in Overall Macroeconomic Policy
Niger  0.8  Burundi  0.8
Uganda  0.8  Malawi  0.8
Burundi  0.7  Mauritania  0.7
Mauritania  0.7  Niger  0.7
Nigeria  0.7  Kenya  0.5
MaLwi  0.5  Sierra  Leone  0.2
Mali  0.6  Rwanda  0.2
Senegal  0.5  Mozambique  0.1
Kenya  0.3
Central  African  Republic  02
Togo  0.2
No Change or Deterioration in Overall Macroeconomic Policy
Benin  0.0  Marl  0.0
Rwanda  0.0  Central  African  Republic  0.0
Sierra  Leone  -0.2  Senegal  -0.1
Gabon  -0.5  Togo  -0.2
Zambia  -0.7  Benin  -0.3
Mozambique  -1.0  Zambia  -0.4
Caffieroon  -1.2  Gabon  -0.9
Congo  -1.2  Congo  -1.6
Cote  d'lvoire  -1.3  Cameroon  -2.0
Cote  d'lvoire  -2.0
Note:  Poicy ranking  based  on fiscal, monetar and  emhange rate policy  scores  reported  in table A2
The regression  based  weights  are 36.7%  weight  for fiscal policy  a 11.8  % weight  for monetary  policy
and a 51.5%  weight for exchange  rate policy. These  weights  are derived  from regression  11  in table 11.
-39-investors  that the changes  made  are durable  ones, thus  providing  a more favorable  investment  climate. As
the results here demonstrate  the reform process is fragile. The reforms undertaken  to date are a good
start. but more remains  to be done to put in place the macroeconomic  conditions  necessary  (though
certainly  not sufficient)  for broad-based,  sustainable  growth.
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43Annex A:  Updating  Adjustment  in Africa
To update Adjustment  in Africa  wc obtained  the 1992  data needed  to construct  the macroeconomic
policics  indexes. In addition,  many  of the data prior to 1992  were also revised  to reflect  newly available
information. The  revised  data used in assessing  country  perfomance are presented  in the statistical  tables
comprising  Annex B. Changes  in the  results obtained  in the original  study  stem  from revisions  to the
economic  data as well  as changes  in policies  and outcomes  that occur  due to the inclusion  of the 1992  data.
The  two effects  can be differentiated  by recomputing  the indexes  over  the same  period  covcred  by the original
study  (1981-86  to 1987-91  for the index  of macroeconomic  policy change  and 1990-91  for fe  stance) and
compang the new  results to those in the original  study. Any change  in the results  in this case will  th  result
of data revision. The next step is to compare  the indexes  calculated  for the period  (through 199  1) covered  by
the original  study  based on the revised  data with the indexes  calculated  through 1992. The change  in policy is
computed  by comparing  the  change  in the average  policy  stance  from 1981-86  to 1987-92  while  the policy
stanceiscomputedoverthe 199l-92period. Differencesinthe 1991  andthe 1992endyearindexesreflect
changes  in policy.
Data on macroeconomic  outcomes  in 1992  and revised  data for prior years were also obtained.
These  data arc also presented  in Annex  B.
L. Changes in OveraD  Macroeconomic  Policies
Table A.  1 compares  overall  macroeconomic  index  based on the foElowing  sets of data: (1) data used
in the original  study forthe periods 1981-86  and 1987-91;  (2) reviseddata,  for the periods 1981-86  and
1987-9  1; (3) revised  data, for the period 1981-86  and 1987-92. More  detailed  information  on the calculation
of each  of these  indexes  is presented  in Tables  A.2-A.4. As a result  of revisions  in the underlying  policy data,
the overall  macroeconomic  policy  scores  of three  countries  in the study  were revised  for the periods 1981-86
and 1987-91. As shown  in Table  Al, data revisions  resulted  in the  movement  of Madagascar  fom the small
improvement  category  to the large  improvement  classification.  Benin  and the Central  African  Republic
moved  from the deterioratio to the small  improvement  category. Togo  had been  erroneously  classified  in
Adjustment  in Africa  as in the deterioration  category;  with the corrected  score  of 0.2, it moved  into the small
improvement  category.
With the addition  of the 1992  data,  two other  countries  experenced  changes  in the overall  policy
score that resulted  in changes  in the coumny  classification The  policy  performance  of Benin  and Nigeria
falls,  from little  improvement  to deterioration  in the case  of Benin,  and from Large  improvement  to small
improvement  in the case  of Nigeria.
The following  sections  examine  how  countries  fared  in the three  components-fiscal,  monetary,  and
exchange  rate policy-that  make  up the  overall index  of macroeconomic  change.
A. Changes in Underlying Fiscal  Policy
As pointed  out earlier,  the fiscal  policy  score  is measured  by the change  in the overall  fiscal  deficit,
excluding  grants, with a change  in total revenue  modifier  being  added. While  the underlying  fiscal  deficit
numbers  themselves  show  many  revisions,  only in dte  case of Madagascar  and Zambia  do these revisions
-44-result  in a change  in the fiscal  policy  score.' Madagascar's  fiseal  policy  score changcd  becausc  of downward
revision  to the estimates  of the overall  fiscal  deficit. In Lhe  case  of Zambia,  the  estimates  orthe change  in
total  revcnue  have  been  revised  downwards.  As a result  of this revision,  Zambia  now  rcceives  a negative
revenue  modifier  for its rcvcnue  collection  efforts.
With the addition  of the 1992  data the fiscal  policy  scorcs  of scven  countries  have been  revised: four
countries  show an improvement  in fiscal  policy  (the  Gainbia,  Mauritania,  Niger and Tanzania)  and threc
countries  show a deterioration  in fiscal  policy  (Congo,  Malawi,  and Mozambique).  Without  exception, all of
the  changes  in the fiscal  policy  scores  result from changes  in the overall fiscal  deficit  and not from the
revenue  modifier.
B. Changes  in Monetary  Policy
The score for monetary  policy  is composed  of the average  of the score for the change  in seignorage
and the score for inflation.2 As was indicated  in the paper,  the estimates  of seignoragc  used in the study  are
corrected  for increases  in the real  demand  for money. Revisions  to both the money  aggregates  as well  as real
GDP  will therefore  affect  the estimates  of seignorage.  The monetary  policy  score  of five  countries  changed
as a rcsult  of revised  data  with the  monetary  policy  scores  of two countries  (Benin  and Mauritania)  revised
downwards  and the scores  of three  countries  (Burundi,  Cameroon,  and Zambia)  revised  upwards.  In the case
of Benin,  both the estimatcs  of seignorage  and  inflation  were  revised. The estimate  of seignorage  was
revised  downwards,  improving  the score,  while  the revised  estimate  of inflation  was revised  upwards
(inflation  did not fall as much  as original  data indicated)  with the impact  being  a deterioration  in the score.
The score on seignorage  outweighs  the inflation  score  with the  result being  an improvement  in the monetary
policy  score for Benin. For Burundi,  estimates  of seignorage  were not available  in the original  study. Wirth
the  reised  data, however,  estinates of seignorage  were  obtained  and they have  a positive  impact  on the
monetary  policy  score.  The seignorage  estimates  for Zambia  were revised  downwards  with the results being
a positive  impact  on the monctary  policy  scorc.  In addition  to Benin,  the inflation  scores  of Cameroon  and
Mauitania were  revised  Cameroons  inflation  rate was revised  downwards,  with a positive  impact  on the
score,  while  the Mauritania's  was revised  upwards,  with a negative  unpact on the score.
The addition  of 1992  data oD  seignorage  and inflation  changed  the monetary  policy  score  of five
countries. With the exception  of Nigeria, all of these  changes  had a positive  impact  on the monetary  policy
score. Cameroon  had an improvement  in its seignorage  score as did Gabon,  which  also had an improvement
in its inflation  score.  Niger  and Uganda  also had an improvement  the inflation  score. Nigeria,  on the other
hand, saw a deterioration  in both its seignorage  and inflation  score. This is consistent  with the monetization
of the increase  in Nigeria's  fiscal  deficit
' lathe  case of Ghana,  Adjustment  in Africa  used the narrow  definition  of the deficit  whluc  this
paper  uses the broad  definition.
2  In the original  study  three  measues of inflation  were intcrmixed the CPI deflator,  the GDP
deflator  and the personal  consumption  deflator. The revised  data only  uses the CPI deflator  and the
GDP deflator. Since  indicators  in this paper onlv  use data firon 1980  onwards,  the lack of data
availability  for the 1970s  is not a problem. In Adjustment  in Africa if the CPI  was not available  for
the period 1970-91,  the PC defator was  used. In this paper,  if the CPI  deflator  was available  for the
1980s,  it was used, otherwise  the GDP  deflator  was used
-45-C  Exchange Rate Policy
As noted  earlier,  whether  the cxchange  rate policy  score  is a composite  of the change  in rcal effective
exchange  rate and the black market  premium  depends  on the  country's  cxchange  ratc regimc. For  the non-
CFA countries,  the exchange  rate policy  score is the average  of the two while  for the CFA countries. Only
the real cxchange  rate enters  into  the exchange  rate policy  scorc.  The  real exchange  data comes  from two
sourecs:  from  the World  Bank's  Africa  Region  for the countrics  in the CFA franc  zone  and from  the IMF for
all other  countries. Change  in the real cxchange  rate can come  from  revisions  to domestic  or foreign  inflation
rates as well as revisions  to the trade weights  used  to compute  the index
With the revised  data,  six countries  experienced  a change  in their exchange  rate policy  score. Two
countries  (The  Gambia  and Zambia)  experienced  a negative  change  to the score while  four countrics  (Benin,
Burkina  Faso,  Central  African  Republic  and Gabon)  experienced  a positive  change  to the exchange  rate
score. Only  in the case of The GCambia  did data revisions  result  in a change  in the  black market  premium
score. All other  changes  were  due to revisions  in the  real effective  exchange  rate.
With the addition  of 1992,  two countries  (The  Gambia  and Rwanda)  expeienced an improvement  m
the exchange  rate score while  two countries  (Beain and Kenya)  suffered  a deterioration  in their  exchange  rate
score.
IL  Changes to the Overall Macroeconomic  Policy  Stance
Table A.5 compares  the overall  macroeconomic  policy  stance,  computed  as follows;  (1) original  data,
forte  period 1990-91;  (2) revised  data, for the period 1990-9  1; (3) revised  data, for the period  1991-92.
Tables  A.6-A.8 provide  information  on the fiscal,  monetary  and exchange  rate stance  used in calculating  each
of indxes.  The  overall  macrocmomic policy  stance  in Africa  did not change  significantly  as a result  of data
revisions  to the undelying policv data. Three  countries  moved  up in the policy  ranlcings  (The  Gambia,  Niger,
and Tanzania),  while  four counties moved  down  ( Burkina  Faso,  Gabon, Ghana  and Nigeria). As will  be
seen in the  next scction,  the changes  in overall  rankings  due to data revisions  stemmed  mainly  from  revised
fiscal  and real interest  rate data.
The  policy  stance  in the sample  countries  deteriorated  in 1991-92  period  compared  to the 1990-91
period. Seven  counties dropped  in ranking  and only  two countries  increased  in ranking. While  thirteen
countries  were classified  as having  a poor or very  poor poliy stance  in 1990-91,  using  the 1991-92  period,
this number  increased  to sixteen. While  two countmries  showed  improvement-Burldna  Faso and Mozambique
moved  from the classification  of poor/very  poor  to that of fair, Kenya,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mali, and Togo
dropped  from the fair to the poor/very  poor  categories.  Nigeria,  Rwanda  and Zimbabwe  moved  from  poor to
very poor. The majoriLy  of the counties changed  categories  because  of changes  in fiscal and  exchange  rate
policy. Changes  in monetary  policy  did not, for the  most part, have any  impact  on the classification  of the
sample  countries.
A. Changes in the Fiscal Policy Stance
The fiscal  policy  stance,  measured  as the overall  fiscal  deficit,  incluing extnal  grants,  was also
subject  to data revisions.  The raning of fiscal  policy  for eight countries  changed  with the revised 1990-91
data. In five  cases, the fiscal  policy  stance  deteriorated,  while  in tbree cases it improved.
-46-With the 1992  data, seven  countries  cxperienced  a decline  in the fiscal policv  stance  whilc  four
countrics  improved  their  fiscal  policy  stance. Overall,  the fiscal  policy  stance  in the sample  countries  is poor.
In the 1990-91  pcriod,  in L7  countries  fiscal  policy  is classificd  as poor or very  poor. Four  additional
countries  move  into these  categories  with the inclusion  of the 1992  data. Ghana, Malawi,  Madagascar  and
Togo  had been  classified  as havc  a fair or good  fiscal stance  in the 1990-91  period  and arc now are  classificd
in the lower two  categories.  Conversely,  only Burkina  Faso  improved  its fiscal  policy  stance  in the 1991-92
period  by moving  into  the upper two categories.
B. Changes in the Monetary Policy Stance
Almost all the  data revisions  to the monetary  policy  stance  came  through  the rcal interest rate
indicator,  as the L991  rcal interest  rates wcer  calculated  using  expected  inflation  (1992 inflation  data)  instead
of actual  inflation  in 1991  as in the original  study. Two  countries  improved  a category: Congo  and Tanzania,
while  six countries  dropped  a category: Ccntral  African  Republic,  Gabon,  Ghana.  Kenya,  Nigeria,  and
Uganda.
The 1991-92  period  showed  a deterioration  in the monetary  policy  stae.  Eight  countries  were
classified  as having  a poor  or very poor monetary  policy  stance  in the 1990-91  period. This number
increased  by one with the inclusion  of the 1992  data. Madagascar  dropped  into the lower  two  categories  as a
result  of a deterioration  in the seignorage  indicators. Three  other  countries  fell by one category,  while  one
cotmtry  improved.
C. Changes in the Exchange Rate Policy  Stance
The exchange  rate policy  stance  was fairly  robust to data  revisions. In only three  cases did the
exchange  rate policy  stance  change  with data revisions. The Gambia,  Madagascar  and Mozambique  had
revied information  on thir  parallel  market exchange  rate premium,  which  resulted  in a shift in category.
None of the exchange  rate policy  stancs  in the CFA countries  changed  with the inclusion  of 1992
data. For the non-CFA  countries,  however,  three countries  improved  their exchange  rate policy  stance  by
reducing their premium and six counties  experienced a decline in  their exchange rate policy stance with the
widening  of their premiunn Overall  sixteen  countries  were  classified  as having a poor or very  poor exchange
rate policy  stance in the 1990-91  period. This number  increased  to twenty  with the 1991-92  data The
majority  of the countries  in these lower  two categories  are CFA  countries.
-47-Table  Al.  Revisions  and Changes  to the Overall  Macroeconomic  Policy  Score
IZ  Original  data_  1Z1  . Revised  data
go in policies,  1981/85  to 1987191  IChange  In  pollcIes,  1981/86  to 1987/91  IChange  in polides,  1931/88  to 1987/8
Large  improvement  In Overall  Macroeconomic Policies
Ghana  2.2  Ghana  1.8  Ghana  1.8
Tanzania  1.5  Tanzania  1.5  Tanzania  1.8
Gambia,  The  1.2  Burkina  Faso  1.3  Gambla,  The  1.6
Burkina  Faso  1.0  Madagascar  1.2  Burkina  Faso  1.3
Nlgeria  1.0  Gambia,  The  1.0  Madagascar  1.2
Zimbabwe  1.C  Nigerla  1.0  Zimbabwe  1.0
Zimbabwe  1.0
Small  Improvement  In Overall  Macroeconomic  Policies
Madagascar  0.8  Malawi  0.8  Niger  0.8
Malawi  0.8  Burundi  0.7  Uganda  0.8
Burundi  0.5  Kenya  0.5  Eurundl  0.7
Kenya  0.5  Mal  0.5  Mauritania  0.7
Mali  0.5  Senegal  'i.5  Nigeria  0.7
Mauritania  0.5  Benln  0.3  Malawi  0.5
Senegal  0.5  MaurItanIa  0.3  Mali  0.5
Nlger  0.3  Niger  0.3  Senegal  0.5
Togo  0.2  Central  African  Republic  0.2  Kenya  0.3
Uganda  0.2  Togo  0.2  Central  African  Repubflc  0.2
Uganda  0.2  Togo  0.2
Deterioration  orno Change  In Overall  MacroeconomIc  Policies
Benin  -0.2  Rwanda  -0.2  Benin  0.0
Central  African  Repubilc  -0.2  Sierra  Leone  -0.2  Rwanda  0.0
Rwanda  . -0.2  Mozambique  -0.7  Sierra  Leone  -0.2
Slerra  Leone  -0.2  Zambia  -0.7  Gabon  -0.5
Zambla  -0.3  Congo  -0.8  Zambia  -0.7
Mozambique  -0.7  Gabon  -0.0  Mozambique  -1.0
Congo  -0.8  Cameroon  -1.3  Cameroon  -1.2
Cote  d'lvolre  -1.3  Cote  d'lvolre  -1.3  Congo  -1.2
Cameroon  -1.5  Cote  dIvoire  -1.3
Gabon  -1.5
A score of 1.0 or more  reflects  a large  Improvement  In macroeconomic  policies;  0 to 1.0,  a small  Improvement;  and  0 and  below,  a deterioration.
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S  rn.  w.SaaTable  A5. Overall  Macroeconomic  Policy  Stance
I  Odginal  data  Reviseo  data
Policy  Stance,  1990-91  I1olicy  Stance,  199-9  IPolicy  Stance,  1991-92
Adequate  Macroeconomic  Policy  Stance
Ghana  1.2  Gambia, The  1.3  Gambia, The  1.3
Fair  Macroeconomic  Polky Stance
Burundl  1.7  Uganda  1.8  Tanzana  2.0
The  Gambia  1.8  Ghana  1.9  Burkdna  Faso  2-2
Madagascar  1.8  Burundi  2.0  Ghana  2.2
Malawi  1.9  Madagascar  2.0  Mauritania  2.2
Burkina  Faso  2.0  Malawi  2.0  Niger  2.2
Kenya  2.0  Kenya  2.2  Senegal  2.2
Gabon  2.1  Mauritania  2.2  Burundi  2.3
Mauritania  2.2  Nipr  2.2  Mozambique  2.3
Senegal  2.2  Senegal  2.2  Uganda  2.3
Togo  2.2  Mali  2.3
Mall  2.3  Tanzania  2.3
Nigeria  2.3  Togo  2.3
Uganda  2.3
Poor  Macroeconomk  Polky Stance
Central  African  Republic  2.4  Burkina Faso  2.4  Benin  2.4
Niger  2.6  Benin  2.6  Mali  2.4
Benin  2.7  Gabon  2.6  Gabon  2.6
Tanzania  2.7  Nigeria  2.6  Madagascar  2.7
Rwanda  2.8  Rwanda  2.8  Togo  2.7
Zimbabwe  2.9  Zimbabwe  2.8  Central  African Republic  2.9
Central African Republic  2.9
Very  Poor  Macroeconomic  Pollcy  Stance
Cole  d'lvolre  3.1  Congo  3.1  Cote dlvoire  3.1
Cameroon  3.2  Cote d'Ivoire  3.1  Malawi  3.1
Congo  3.3  Cameroon  3.2  Cameroon  3.2
Mozamblque  3.7  Mozambique  3.3  Congo  3.2
Sierra  Leone  4.0  Sierra  Leone  4.0  Rwanda  3.2




Sierra Leone  3.7
A score  of less  than  1.4  Is  considered  adequate;  1.4  to  2.3,  fair;  2.4  to  3.0,  poor;  and  3.0  and  above,  very  poor.
Source:  Tables  AG,  A7  and  A8.Table AS. Components of Macroeconomic Policy Stance, 1990-91
¶I&rom  Adjustment In  Africa)
Ovenil  il-  - M°V  Penilel meriet  ongetar  M1&  r  t1  0bE  no
belensmolding podlicy  B  z  idath  h  lle  r  L  goOy  ezrlhag  Mtfe  ffienane  tt  ra  te  Rte
Country  ntaltoraODl?  awre  Paetrnt  Sere  Peruat  score  Persent  Sare  _  - 'irelmaneairmsnel  lince iSO foentfi  r9k  1  .e"I
Benin  .5.3  3  2.7  3  0.1  1  6.6  2  to  2  _.l  3  3  27  Baii
Burkina  Faso  .3.4  2  -0.1  1  I'  1  2.6  1  1tD  103  3  3  2.0  Burkina  Faso
Burundi  .3.3  2  8.0  I  1.0  20.9  2  2  12  Burundi
Cameroon  .8.6  4  0.0  I  0.5  1  S.7  3  1.7  18.0  4  4  32  Cameron
Central African  Republic  .6.5  3  -O'6  1  0.3  1  6.8  2  1.3  9.1  3  3  2.4  CeGtalAfrican Republi
Congo  .7.7  4  0.8  2  .0.3  1  8.7  3  to  .9.2  4  4  33  Congo
Coto d'lvoire  13.0  4  0.4  1  0.6  1  5.4  2  1.3  2.S  4  4  3-1  cotb  edlvir
abon  1.8  2  0.2  1  5.2  1  0.7  2  1.3  7.8  3  3  2.1  Gabon
The Gambia  2.7  1  1.8  3  10.4  2  3.2  2  Z3  21.3  2  2  1.5  The Gambia
Ghana \a  0.9  1  0.4  1  27.6  3  2.8  1  1.7  S4  t  t  1t2  Ghana \a
Kenya  65.6  3  IS  3  13.3  2  -1.0  I  2.0  7.3  t  1  2o0  Ea
Madagascar  65.1  3  1.6  2  6.6  1  1.  7.1  1  I  15  Madagascar
Malawi  .2.5  2  1.0  2  12.2  2  0.3  1  1.7  29.4  2  2  10.  Malawi
Mall  -5.3  3  -0.6  1  3.3  1  2.8  1  1.0  10.8  3  3  2.3  If al
Mauritania  *09  1  1.1  2  6.6  1  1.5  166.6  4  4  22  Mlauitania
Mozambique  *9.0  4  35.9  3  3.0  62.6  4  4  3.7  Itlozbiq
Niger  -71.3  4  .0.7  1  .4.3  1  16.0  3  1.7  28.0  2  2  26  Niger
Nigeria  .4.5  3  2.9  3  10.2  2  1.7  1  2.0  25.1  2  2  2±3  Ngria
Rwanda  -to  3  0.8  2  11.9  2  -99  3  23  47.6  3  3  2t8  Randa
Senegal  -1.1  1  .0.8  t  .0.7  I  8.9  3  1.7  -4.0  4  4  22  Sea  lg
Sierra  Leone  -7.7  4  6.2  4  106.8  4  40.7  4  4.0  104.4  4  4  4.0  Sierra  leon
LA  Tanzania  .0.9  1  7.6  4  21.0  2  30  74.5  4  4  27  TanZnia
3  Togo  *3.8  2  1.4  2  1.0  1  5.9  Z  1.7  9.7  3  3  2.2  ToP
Uganda  -4.1  3  32.2  3  -2.9  1  2.0  24.6  2  2  2.3  Ugand
Zambia  38.5  4  4.0  4  101.8  4  4.0  149.7  4  4  40  ZDmbia
Zimbabwe  *.3  4  2.5  3  20.8  2  .12.5  3  2.7  2.5  2  1  1  2  2.3  iZmbabwe
Source:  Authors,  eaeulationa
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escora2c  o  t2  26o1  s,war  of3.  grsalertanio.asconrec4  Arl st4teraslratsbeta  znen3d-3wsoflsens  fell,3to70r .3Io-7.swdet  WUrthW  n7orw7to.1.ascom3X ltertm  -115.sac"d4.
The ovel  mneutry  policy scos  Is  sImple svwuge of to  eslirgo,  Ibatllon  mad  rsttst  rale scre.
Exdiargaeratepolcystems:  Apra4milben1lOa  glvecE el;101o30.  srm  olt20WasorOl3:padtmio.att  AREEROf'W  tI,ba  n  rssisaredl
20to40, ac00ft2;  6to 20.  a  mreor3  less tm  S.wea  04.
Trie onrDn maceeconomc  pomy score is t  anvee  of t  scSl  monetay  d enhng  rate poly  swtres.
ia  Ghana  * Narmw  defiet defirfdlonTable  A7. Components  of  Macroeconomic  Policy  Stance,  1590o91
(Updated  and  realsed  data)
Fonetr  Poln  Icy  Eicsearante  polIcy
Over  D  1  Ziiee  nI alv  r=iFel  Manat  cur4e  -TCange  ihereal  zS  nager_
balance  inluding  policy  S  rlaniean  LJnill  Rhalhuhntte  poiwy  exchange  rate  effhcoive  amnheoga  nto  Mte  POlic
Countrv  rints t or  aOi  &rco  Percern  Sco  Pernxt  cors  Percent  Sawr  a_re  Pemilum  freen  -. 1:i1J  reu'  enO  odvaon  -
Bonin  40.2  3  2.7  3  1.7  1  1.2  1  117  16.2  3  3  2.6  Beun
13urkina  Faso  .4.3  3  .0.2  1  0.8  I  6.8  a  1.3  13.4  3  3  z4  Burkina  Faso
Burundi  *5.1  3  8.0  t  1.0  21.0  2  2  to  Burundi
Cameroon  .i.3  4  0.3  1  3.8  1  3.  3  1.7  *24.S  4  4  22  Cameroon
Central  African  Republic  *9.5  4  *0.5  1  *1.4  t  9.6  3  1.7  122  3  3  Z9  Central  African  Republic
Congo  *10.1  4  1.1  2  2.2  1  2.1  1  1.3  -7.8  4  4  3.1  Congo
Cote  d'lvoire  *13,7  4  0.2  1  0.8  1  4.3  2  1.3  -1.6  4  4  II  Cotedioir.e
Gabon  .4.5  3  0.2  1  4.0  1  14.4  3  1.7  9.1  3  3  2e1  Gabon
Gambia,  The  2.7  1  1.9  3  10.4  2  2.7  I  1  0  z2.2  1  1  1.3  Gambia.  The
Ghana aN  .2.9  2  0.7  2  27.7  a  10.2  3  2.?  3.4  1  1  1.9  Ghana a\
Kenya  *4.9  J  2.1  3  17.7  2  2.5  7.38  1  2z2  Kerna
hMadagasear  .2.8  2  1.5  2  10.2  2  2.0  19.0  2  2  2t0  aligdscar
Mlnlnwi  *2.6  2  1.3  2  12.2  2  *4.4  2  2.0  29.4  2  2  zo  bMalawi
Mali  *5.1  3  .o7T  1  3.0  1  2.8  1  1.0  9.2  3  3  Z2  Mlali
Mauritania  .0.7  1  1.0  2  6.3  1  .4.3  2  1.7  166.6  4  4  2.2  d2uriia
Mlozambique  .8.6  4  31.9  3  3.0  46.2  3  3  23  lozambique
Niger  *6.0  3  *0.6  1  .4.3  I  14.0  3  1.7  29.1  2  2  22  Niger
Nigeria  *6.2  J  2.8  3  10.2  2  *7.3  3  2.7  25.1  2  2  16  Nigeri
Rwanda  .6.9  3  0.a5  11.9  2  *5.7  2  1.  47.8  3  3  ia  Rwenda
Senegal  .0.4  1  *0.9  1  0.7  1  8.0  3  1.7  *2.5  4  A  2.2  se&1
LA  Sierra  Leone  *7.3  4  6.6  4  10.8  4  S351,  4  4.0  104.4  4  4  40  Sierra  kone
Tanzania  .0.7  1  21.0  2  20  74.8  4  4  23  Tanzania
Togo  .8.8  2  1.6  2  0.7  1  6.1  2  2.0  10.1  3  3  2.3  Tag
Uganda  b\  .0.9  I  30.6  3  *5.7  2  2.5  24.6  2  2  1J  Uganda  bX
Zambia  .8.4  4  8.8  4  108.6  4  *44.0  4  4.0  149.6  4  4  40o  Zambia
ainbabwe  .8.5  4  2.7  3  20.4  2  2  5  823.5 2  1  _  1  2  2a  7Zimbabwe
our:  Auttart'alcuialiora.
Note:  Flecelpelcyetenca:
Menaarypolcyalance:  Sdlgncdra3tbhsoano.Swasgl  vneswacdl;  0.6btol,,edaseul2;  151o3e3acoredaJ3:  creirlhn3.aacorao4.  Irfn  lesseonlOwuglnnaaorradl;  10b26S.
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Exdwne rate  poncy  dac:  A  preium forufo  M  10  we gisven  a score  o  PJ  l  o  30,  a ace d  2; 20  to 60.  a  eof  3 grater ta  l  0. aeSowsd  4.  A RfEER  of  gratertn  I40  wua  n  a are  ofl;
20  P 40.  a &coreof  2; 6 P 20. scre of 3  len On  ,  a score  d4.
lhe  evemln  macrsnemic prolcy  score  In  TM  avere  of  te Mscal  monely  i  eange  mta poioy  ewes.
%a  Gwans Narro denldI  detWr*ofTable  AS. Components  of Macroeconomic  Pollcy Stance,  1991-92
(Updated  ard ta1sed  date)
Fl4cal  pvalc  Mt  nita  Plir  Exchanne  mts  CY  Onia.
Ovetil  flcat  Fialu  Monetary Prallel  mart  C  inage  larthe  at  Ea-1aP1a  mose  ic
balance  inluding  poliq  selniae  lSulln  ReamlLa lkmis  poicy  ezchoapte  effeciv  exchage  rts  nat  poey
Countrv  nrants  Ie orciOD l  ie  Percent  Scor  Pecen  nt  Sco  ee  soe  onLrulum(percent)  since  1tO 'vern)  r  me
Benin  5.1  3  1.4  2  6.0  1  .2.7  1  1.3  12.4  3  3  2.4  Beani
Burkina Faso  .2.7  2  0.1  1  0.3  1  8.1  a  1i7  14.9  3  3  2.2  Burkina  Faso
Birundt  C5.1  3  6.8  1  1.0  45.2  3  3  23  BDundi
Cameroon  *7.2  4  .1.1  1  0.1  1  9.5  3  1.7  -31.4  4  4  u2  Cameroon
Central African Republic  .10.1  4  .0.3  1  *1.9  1  9.7  3  1.7  17.0  3  3  22  Central  Afican  Republi
Congo  .13.9  4  0.7  2  5.6  1  6.5  2  1.7  .10.0  4  4  32  Conga
Cote dIlvoire  .13.G  4  0.5  1  2.6  1  4.1  2  1.3  *2.4  4  4  31  Cote  sdloire
Gabon  *3.7  3  -07  1  *46  1  2W.3  3  1.7  18.4  3  3  zs  Gabon
Gambin,  The  29  1  1.9  3  9.0  1  4.9  2  2.0  .4.2  1  1  1.3  Gambia.  The
Ghana  a\  .6.0  3  2.3  3  14.0  2  8.0  3  2.7  6.b  1  1  22  Gbana  a\
Kenya  *4.6  3  3.5  4  24.7  2  3.0  879  4  4  33  Kenya
kladagawcar  G6.0  3  3.3  4  11.6  2  3.0  19.1  2  2  17  Madegascar
IMalawvi  853  4  2.0  3  17.7  2  .6.7  2  2.3  39.1  3  3  31  bialawi
Mali  *5.8  3  0.4  1  411  1  3.2  2  13  11.9  3  3  z4  Mali
Mauritania  0.8  I  1.1  2  9.7  1  4.4  2  1.7  149.0  4  4  2z2  Mauritania
Mozambique  .5.4  3  40.1  3  3,0  1.7  1  1  23  ozaEnbique
Niger  .6.0  3  0.6  1  *6.1  1  124  3  1.7  36.6  2  2  z2  Nipr
Nigeria  .6.8  4  8.0  4  28.8  3  .22.7  4  3.7  34.5  3  3  so  Nigeria
Rwanda  76  4  1.4  2  14.6  2  .2.4  1  17  82.6  4  4  32  Rwanda
Senegal  1.1  1  0.1  1  .0.9  1  7.8  3  117  0.9  4  4  22  Sengal
Sierra Leone  *4.4  3  4.5  4  84.1  4  .23.1  4  4,0  66.9  4  4  2.  SierraLonae
Un  Tanzania  0.6  1  222  2  2.0  45.2  3  3  20  Tanzania
i  Toga  s3.8  3  0.9  2  0.0  1  7.2  3  20  10.9  3  3  27  Togo
Uganda  b\  S3.6  2  40.3  3  7.1  3  30  13.2  2  2  23  Uganda b\
Zambia  -4.8  3  4.0  4  142.5  4  .5086  4  40  43.3  3  3  13  Zambia
Zimbabwe  .7.7  4  1.5  3  32.7  3  30  31.1  3  J  1  1  3  313  Zlmbabwe
ourer  FAil ore'calcularions.
Note:  Filealpolicy  lanca Atscatdecil gwarlhan.1.pclweagene  se  of  1;rrm.1.5  ta.38.e  7  3  a7ears  3sub  n 7.aor.
Manealaypolcystance:  SelgnolrolessttnO.Swaesglvenaseoll;  06blo  o.O.scoreof;  1.51o3ll,maeofI  grsaeerthn3,asc  cfd4. MteaSon  lesaslmlOwasswaensconsel:;  10b25.
esceeof);  251o60,escmote3;  graeeethenb,S0orenot4  Ateallt  nterellbent*en3end.3watgvesecncfl.St7wr 4t.asw7  *dt  grearhan70r-7ao.l16eeorecq;  ieeatm  -15eswafod.
The  overall  moneltay  poliey  screo  l  e  siaple  aer  of  te sel"n"lra  Ig, llon  en4  real  Intersat  rale  scon.
Oeng  rai polcysance:  Apromioneoflessathen  10  was  O  n  a ewe S1:  10  to  30e score  od2 20toSO  a  scoad  goil3eretan  50a  a  soresa  f.4  AREERSofgreat  gma40wsu givene  aft1;
20to40,  scoroof2;  6to20  a scooefr3: loseOmn escarbamd4
The  overall  macroeconomic  pe  tq scre lteha  average  of  te 5Al  mneoey and  exchoge  ra  ponicy  Scores.
la Ghana -Narrow  dffd  ddefrllr,n.Table  Bi.  Total  Revenue
(In percent of GDP)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1986  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Benin  13.8  17.8  18.6  14.8  11.9  12.9  13.1  12.9  12.7  9.4  9.9  11.5  12.2
Burkina Faso  13.6  12.6  14.0  12.8  13.3  18.5  11.4  13.0  11.7  11.5  13.2  14.0  12.5
Burundi  13.4  13.1  15.0  12.6  13.6  13.2  16.0  13.6  15.0  18.2  15.3  16.9  16.7
Camneroon  16.9  24.9  24.7  27.1  23.2  18.8  22.7  19.0  17.8  16.8  14.5  16.1  17.2
Central African Republic  12.9  13.2  14.5  14.6  14.2  13.2  11.7  11.8  12.4  12.0  12.3  10.2  9.6
Congo  29.1  38.8  35.2  33.6  34.3  33.7  34.8  20.5  19.4  22.2  27.1  26.5  24.5
Cote d'lvoire  28.3  27.8  26.7  29.2  34.1  36.6  28.9  25.5  25.7  22.8  23.4  21.9  22.3
Gabon  29.2  33.1  34.5  31.4  32.3  32.4  35.2  20.6  21.2  18.8  21.4  24.2  22.6
The Gambia  22.2  18.3  18.0  17.4  20.1  19.0  19.3  21.4  20.4  23.2  21.7  19.8  22.5
Ghana  6.9  4.5  5.5  5.5  8.0  11.3  13.7  14.1  13.5  13.6  11.8  13.8  11.1
Kenya  24.5  25.3  24.6  23.1  22.2  22.1  22.6  22.6  23.1  23.1  23.0  23.3  23.7
Madagascar  14.7  12.4  12.2  11.9  13.8  12.9  12.0  14.6  13.1  14.2  14.9  10.1  12.4
Malawi  19.1  19.2  18.6  19.2  19.5  22.1  21.2  19.8  20.7  21.8  19.5  18.8  19.8
Mali  12.6  11.5  12.3  12.9  13.3  14.9  17.9  15.1  14.5  16.8  17.1  16.9  13.3
Mauritania  17.2  19.1  19.3  21.6  23.2  24.6  24.8  25.6  24.9  23.1  24.6  22.7  21.2
Mozambique  19.3  23.2  29.9  29.8  20.7  13.1  13.2  16.1  19.9  23.5  22.4  23.5  25.9
Niger  13.8  12.6  11.3  11.2  10.9  11.1  11.0  11.3  10.5  10.3  10.3  8.4  8.2
Ln  Nigeria  24.9  15.1  13.2  11.5  10.3  11.2  17.3  15.9  12.7  16.0  20.2  19.2  NA
Rwanda  12.4  12.2  11.7  10.9  11.2  12.2  13.8  13.4  12.8  12.7  11.3  11.9  12.7
Senegal  22.7  19.3  17.0  18.0  19.3  18.8  17.8  18.7  17.5  16.6  17.2  19.2  15.9
Sierra  Leone  14.8  16.3  12.0  8.4  7.6  6.3  5.5  7.2  8.0  9.2  9.5  12.3  12.0
Tanzania  19.7  20.1  18.2  18.7  19.8  18.9  14.8  16.3  16.9  19.5  21.0  22.5  23.5
Togo  29.0  25.8  28.5  27.5  29.1  29.0  28.5  23.7  23.4  22.7  22.5  17.1  NA
Uganda  2.8  1.9  8.1  11.1  14.3  12.0  7.0  4.9  6.6  5.4  7.0  7.6  7.0
Zambia  25.0  23.3  23.4  24.3  22.2  21.9  23.4  19.8  16.7  17.5  18.6  17.4  16.2
Zimbabwe  21.6  24.1  27.8  31.7  30.3  31.8  33.8  33.5  36.3  36.1  35.1  34.4  37.2
Source: Word EFlank  and lMkV staff estimatesTable B2.  Overall  Fiscal Balance,  excluding  grants
(In  percent  of GDP)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Benin  .11.4  s.2  -14.0  -17.3  -19.0  -13.0  -10.7  -11.0  -9.6  -10.6  -10.0  -7.2  -7.9
Bur!ina Faso  *21.2  -20.1  -20.0  -23.3  -17.2  -7.2  -10.6  -11.0  -9.4  -7.7  -7.6  -7.1  -6.1
Burundi  -10.6  -12.3  -12.6  -18.1  *12.1  .10.2  -8.5  -16.7  -11.7  -9.6  -18.6  -12.8  -14.1
Cameroon  0.4  3.2  0.0  3.5  -0.1  -3.8  -0.4  -13.0  -6.4  -5.1  -8.6  -8.0  -6.3
CentralAficanRepublic  *5.2  .6.7  -1.4  -2.8  -8.1  -18.8  -13.8  -16.4  -13.7  -11.3  -18.1  -18.2  -16.7
Congo  -11.4  0.2  -14.0  -12.6  -6.2  -4.8  -8.2  -12.0  -17.6  -10.1  -6.7  -14.4  .19.8
Cote  d'lvoire  -11.8  -10.5  -13.5  -11.7  .1.6  2.0  -3.0  -8.2  -14.6  -17.8  -13.1  -14.3  -12.9
Gabon  4.6  7.8  8.7  -1.4  -2.0  .4.5  -7.1  *10.8  -11.6  -8.0  *7.2  -2.8  -5.2
The  Gambia  -9.6  -17.9  -18.3  -12.1  -13.4  14.6  -6.9  -15.2  -16.7  -2.8  -8.2  -4.2  .4.4
Ghana  -4.2  -6.5  -6.7  -2.7  -3.1  -4.1  -5.5  -5.1  -5.3  -5.3  -4.8  -4.0  -10.7
Kenya  -7.7  -9.  -8.8  -5.1  -5.4  -7.6  -7.1  -7.6  -5.0  -7.1  -6.6  -7.7  -4.7
Madagascar  -14.9  -12.0  -7.4  -6.0  -4.1  -4.3  -4.2  -4.1  -4.0  -5.5  -2.0  -6.4  -7.7
Malawi  -16.1  -16.5  -10.9  -9.5  -8.4  -10.1  -13.0  -9.4  -7.2  -6.8  -6.2  -5.6  -15.7
4j  Mali  .10.8  .15.5  .9.8  -13.7  -10.0  -15.8  -12.5  -11.2  -10.8  -10.3  -8.3  -11.9  -11.4
Mauritania  -11.6  -10.0  -11.6  -6.3  -4.1  -0.3  1.1  -0.1  -1.2  -6.3  -2.8  -2.2  -0.4
Mozambique  -10.9  -15.2  -9.4  -19.3  -20.7  -14.7  -i1O  -21.1  -24.8  -24.1  -29.5  -26.8  -32.1
Niger  0.5  .6.3  -6.3  -8.5  -8.2  -8.5  -9.4  -8.8  -9.2  -10.6  -12.4  -8.5  -8.6
Nigeria  -0.4  -8.8  -7.4  -9.5  -4.1  -2.4  -2.8  -9.0  -10.9  -5.4  -3.5  -8.8  NA
Rwanda  -4.6  -7.5  -7.6  -8.3  -. 9  -6.4  -7.1  -10.3  -8.9  -8.3  -11.5  -13.1  -17.6
Senegal  -5.7  .12.6  -6.9  .8.1  -6.9  -4.7  -8.9  -2.7  -2.6  -4.2  -4.1  0.4  -1.0
Sierra Leone  -14.1  -15.0  -14.8  -13.4  -9.7  -12.6  -13.6  -18.1  -8.0  -8.0  -12.0  -10.2  -8.9
Tanzania  -18.1  .13.2  -16.3  -10.4  -9.7  .8.2  -8.3  -8.3  -7.8  -6.0  -7.0  -2.7  -2.9
Togo  0.2  -7.4  -3.6  -7.9  -7.0  -7.1  -11  -9.4  -5.3  -6.2  -6.1  -5.2  NA
Uganda  -8.1  -7.9  -9.7  -4.1  -3.5  -5.7  -5.2  4.5  -6.4  -4.7  -5.5  -7.3  -15.0
Zambia  -19.4  -18.7  -15.3  -9.6  -7.8  -14.9  -29.9  -13.1  -13.7  -12.0  -14.8  -14.9  -11.2
Zimbabwe  -13.8  -12.2  -7.8  -8.9  -10.5  -10.6  -10.6  -12.7  -9.4  -10.8  -10.4  -9.6  .8.5
Source: World  Bank and IMF staff estimatesTable  BB. Overall  Fiscal  Balance,  including  grants
(In percent oEGDP)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Benin  -6.2  -1.0  -8.2  -11.9  *13.6  .8.6  -7.9  -7.4  -5.0  -8.2  -7.7  -4.8  -6.4
Burkina Faso  -10.3  -11.4  -12.1  -15.5  .10.0  -1.3  -3.8  .4.2  -3.7  1.5  -5.3  -3.2  -2.2
Burundi  -7.0  -7.8  -8.7  -14.6  -9.0  -6.7  -4.9  -12.8  -9.3  -2.7  -5.5  -4.7  -6.6
Cameroon  0.4  3.2  0.0  3.5  -0.1  -3.3  -0.4  -13.0  -6.4  *5.1  -8.6  -8.0  -6.3
Central African Republic  -1.3  -3.1  0.6  -0.9  -7.0  .8.6  -6.9  -9.3  -3.8  .3.1  -7.3  -11.8  -8.4
Congo  -10.6  0.3  -13.8  .12.2  -5.3  .4.5  -8.2  -11.9  -17.5  -10.0  -6.4  -13.9  -19.8
Cote d'Ivoire  -11.8  -10.5  -13.5  -11.7  -1.6  2.0  -3.0  -8.2  -14.6  -17.8  -13.1  -14.3  -12.9
Gabon  5.0  8.1  9.1  -1.1  -1.6  .4.2  -6.6  -10.3  -11.1  -7.5  .6.7  -2.3  -5.1
The Gambia  .3.7  -4.1  -14.6  -7.1  -8.0  -6.7  11.3  -0.7  -7.5  7.4  -0.1  5.5  0.2
Gbana  -4.1  -6.4  -6.6  -2.7  -2.8  -3.6  -4.7  -4.3  -4.2  -3.8  -3.3  . -2.5  -9.6
Kenya  -7.7  -9.6  -8.8  -6.1  -6.4  -7.6  -7.1  -6.6  -2.9  -4.9  .3.9  -5.9  -3.2
Madagascar  -14.9  -12.0  -7.0  -6.3  -3.2  -3.8  -3.4  -3.3  -3.1  -3.7  -0.2  -6.5  -6.6
Malawi  -10.8  -12.7  -7.6  -7.2  -6.0  -7.8  -9.4  -6.6  -1.3  -2.0  -1.8  -3.5  -13.1
Mali  .4.2  -9.6  -6.8  -8.1  -4.6  -9.6  -7.6  -5.7  -4.9  -4.6  -3.0  -7.3  -4.2
Mauritania  -7.3  -6.1  -10.8  -5.8  -4.1  -0.3  1.1  1.7  -1.2  -3.8  -0.9  -0.6  2.2
Go  Mozambique  -8.3  -12.8  -5.8  -16.1  -17.9  -12.7  -15.7  -11.7  -11.0  -7.5  -13.1  -4.1  -6.6
I  Niger  5.0  -2.5  -2.5  -6.9  -4.8  -4.9  -4.3  -3.4  .4.6  -6.2  -7.0  -5.0  -8.6
Nigeria  -0.4  -8.8  -7.4  -9.5  -4.1  -2.4  -2.8  -9.0  -10.9  -5.4  -3.5  -8.8  NA
Rwanda  -4.6  -3.8  -4.0  -4.7  -1.8  -3.6  -4.5  -8.3  -5.7  -5.3  -7.9  -5.8  -9.9
Senegal  -4.9  -11.6  -5.8  -7.6  -4.7  -3.7  -2.4  -1.6  -1.3  -2.3  -2.9  2.0  0.2
Sierra Leone  14.1  -15.0  -14.8  -13.4  -9.7  -10.6  -8.4  -16.1  -6.6  -6.1  .8.6  -6.0  -2.7
Tanzania  -13.7  -9.8  -13.6  -8.6  -9.7  -8.2  -1.2  -1.1  -1.4  0.8  -2.8  1.3  -0.1
Togo  1.9  -6.8  -1.7  -4.8  -2.2  -2.4  -4.7  -7.3  -3.4  -4.3  -2.9  -3.8  NA
Uganda  -2.7  -6.4  -9.6  -3.6  -3.1  -4.5  -4.8  -2.8  -4.8  -3.2  -1.6  -0.1  -6.9
Zambia  -18.6  -13.1  -14.6  -8.3  .7.3  .14.4  -28.6  -12.6  -12.2  -10.0  -10.4  -6.4  .2.2
Zimbabwe  -12.01  -11.43  -6.79  -7.41  -7.59  -9.13  -9.02  -11.73  -8.14  -9.03  -875  -8.20  -7.10
Source: World Bank and IMP staffestimatesTable 64. Seignolrage
(Percent  of GDP)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Benin  3.0  3.9  4,7  -1.3  1.2  -1.2  -2.5  -3.9  2.0  2.4  3.7  1.7  1.1
Burkina  Faso  1.8  1A  0.9  0.7  0.6  0.2  2.1  0.2  1.0  0.1  -0.7  0.4  -0.2
Burundi  -0.0  2.3  -2.2  2.3  0.3  2.1  0.4  -0.8  -0.0  -0.2  0.6
Cameroon  0.1  1.3  0.7  2.0  0.3  -0.2  0.3  -1.7  1.3  1.6  -0.3  1.0  -3.2
Central  African  Rep.  5.0  4.4  -0.8  1.3  0.7  0.9  -0.3  0.2  -1.3  1.8  -0.7  -0.4  -0.1
Chad  -2.5  3.3  0.1  1.9  7.1  -0.4  -1.4  -1.3  -3.6  0.5  -1.2  0.1  -2.2
Congo  2.2  2.0  1.4  -2.1  0.5  0.9  -2.3  0.8  -0.7  -0.2  3.2  -1.0  2.3
Cote  d'lvoire  -0.4  1.0  -0.1  1.0  2.9  1.4  0.4  -1.3  -0.6  -2.0  0.8  -0.5  -0.6
Gabon  1.3  1.8  0.6  1.1  1.5  0.7  -1.7  -1.9  2.7  0.5  0.1  0.4  -1.7
Gambia,  The  0.1  2.7  1.6  1.5  -0.6  5.6  -0.1  1.5  OA  1.6  0.9  2.9  1.0
Ghana  3.4  4.9  2.2  3.0  3.6  3.0  2.8  3.4  3.2  4.1  0.6  0.8  3.8
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau  8.4  7.7  2.8  4.5  2.3  4.6
Kenya  -2.2  1.0  1.3  0.7  1.4  -0.7  3.3  0.3  -0.5  0.9  2.6  1.5  5.5
Madagascar  3.3  4.4  1.4  -0.8  2.7  -0.2  2.1  2.7  2.1  3.5  -0.6  3.6  3.0
Malawi  0.4  1.5  1.1  -0.4  1.3  0.4  2.2  2.7  3.7  -0.1  OA  2.3  1.7
Mall  0.4  -0.1  2.0  3.0  4.9  0.6  -0.0  -24  -0.1  -1.0  -22  0.7  -0.0
Maurtania  1.5  4.9  -1.5  2.1  3.1  4.4  -1.6  2.3  04  3.3  04  1.6  0.6
Mozambique  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Niger  0.8  1.5  -0.3  -0.4  2.1  0.6  0.5  -1.7  1.1  0.7  -1.8  0.4  -1.4
Nigeria  8.2  1.3  1.2  2.6  1.5  1.4  -1.3  1.4  4.0  1.7  2.1  3.5  6.5
Rwanda  -0.1  -0.9  -0.6  0.3  0.5  0.6  1.5  0.1  0.2  -1.2  04  0.6  2.1
Senegal  2.0  2.8  2.7  -0.6  -0.5  -0.2  2.2  -1.5  -0.5  0.6  -2.1  0.3  -0.1
Sierra  Leone  1.6  -0.4  6.0  5.5  4.8  8.7  12.6  5.2  5.7  8.7  6.5  7.0  2.0
Tanzania  6.6  4.0  4.7  3.0  -0.4  3.4  5.6  4.1  4.3  NA  NA  NA
Togo  0.5  9.6  3.2  -2.4  2.2  -2.8  1.0  -0.5  -7.0  -0.6  2.7  0.9
Uganda  NA  NA  0.7  2.3  5.5  4.8  6.1  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Zambia  -0.1  1.2  3.4  2.5  1.6  5.1  8.0  4.4  6.5  4A  3.6  4.0
Zimbabwe  4.0  0.1  2.1  -1.7  1.7  1.8  1.0  1.1  2.8  1.9  2.9  2A  0.6
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on IMF,  IFS  data.Table B5. Rates  of Inflation
(Percent  change  in CPI)
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1988  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
8.2  15,5  4.5  1.7  -4.9  -4.2  3.6  -0.6  1.4  1.8  1.6  10.3
Burkina  Faso  7.6  12.1  8.3  4.8  6.9  -2.6  -2.7  4.1  -0.3  -08  2.5  -2.0
Burundi  12.2  5.9  8.2  14.3  3.8  1.7  7.1  4.5  11.7  7.0  9.0  4.5
Cameroon 11  11.8  13.3  12.2  11.0  9.0  0.6  -5.3  -3.8  -1.5  6.1  1.5  -1A
Central  African  Republic  13.3  14.6  2.5  10.4  2.2  -7.0  -4.0  0.7  -0.0  -2.8  -1.0
Chad \1  8.0  9.2  -0.5  22.9  -4.2  -16.4  -2.8  8.7  -1.5  1.9  3.7  -5.5
Congo  17.0  12.8  7.7  13.2  5.6  2.4  1.6  4.8  3.7  -4.8  9.1  2.2
Cote  d'lvoire  8.8  7.3  5.9  4.3  1.8  6.8  6.9  7.0  1.0  -0.8  1.7  3.5
Gabon  8.7  16.4  10.7  5.9  -12.9  31.0  -0.9  -8.8  6.7  7.7  0.3  -9.6
Gambia,  The  5.9  10.9  10.6  22.1  18.3  56.6  23.5  11.7  8.3  12.2  8.6  9.5
Ghana  116.5  22.3  122.9  39.7  10.3  24.6  39.8  31.4  25.2  37.3  18.0  10.1
Guinea  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Guinea-Bissau  \1  6.2  16.3  23.1  64.5  44.8  88.0  81.4  79.2  62.9  68.5  71.4  73.7
Kenya  11.6  20.7  11.4  10.3  13.0  4.8  7.6  11.2  12.9  15.6  19.8  29.5
Madagascar  30.5  31.8  19.3  9.9  10.6  14.5  15.0  26.9  9.0  11.8  8.6  14.5
Malawi  11.8  9.8  13.5  20.0  10.5  14.0  25.2  33.9  12.5  11.8  12.6  22.7
Mali  %1  7.9  4.6  8.1  10.0  17.8  -8.0  -0.3  1.9  -0.9  3.0  4.0  4.1
Maurtania 1  6.9  9.8  6.1  13.5  10.3  7.2  10.1  5.3  8.6  3.0  9.6  9.9
Mozambique  11  2.9  16.8  15.4  12.3  43.2  12.7  141.2  46.7  40.0  38.0  39.7  40.5
Niger  22.9  11.6  -2.5  8.4  -0.9  -3.2  -6.7  -1.4  -2.8  -0.8  -7.8  -4.5
Nigeria  20.8  7.7  23.2  39.6  7.4  5.7  11.3  64.5  50.5  7.4  13.0  44.6
Rwanda  6.5  12.6  6.6  5.4  1.8  -1.1  4.1  3.0  1.0  4.2  19.6  9.6
Senegal  5.9  17.4  11.6  11.8  13.0  6.2  -4.1  -1.8  0.4  0.3  -1.8  -0.1
Sierra  Leone  23.4  26.9  68.5  66.6  76.6  80.9  181.6  31.3  62.8  111.0  102.7  65.5
Tanzania  25.7  28.9  27.1  36.1  33.3  32.4  30.0  31.2  25.8  19.7  22.3  22.1
Togo  19.7  11.1  9.4  -3.5  -1.8  4.1  0.1  -0.2  -0.8  1.0  0.4  1.4
Uganda  108.7  49.3  24.1  42.7  157.7  161.0  200.0  196.1  61.4  33.1  28.1  52.4
Zambia  13.0  13.6  19.6  20.0  37.3  51.8  43.0  55.6  127.9  117.5  93.7  191.3
Zimbabwe  13.2  10.6  23.1  20.2  8.5  14.3  12.5  7.4  12.9  17.4  23.3  42.1
Source:  World  Bank  and  IMF  data.
11 G  DP  deflators  used  instead  of CPI.Table  B6. Real  Interest Rates
(Percent)
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Benin I1  -8.0  3.1  5.7  12.7  11.9  2.4  5.9  3.8  4.6  5.3  -3.0  -2.3
Burkina  Faso  -5.2  -0.5  2.5  0.3  10.1  9.0  1.1  5.6  7.3  4.4  9.2  7.1
Burundi  -1.3  -2.9  -8.6  0.7  2.8  -1.1  0.8  -6.9  NA  NA  NA  NA
Cameroon  M1  -5.1  -4.2  -3.2  -1.3  7.0  13.4  11.4  8.8  1.4  6A  9.5  9.5
Central  African  Republic  -5.1  -6.2  4.8  -2.6  5.1  15.4  11.6  6.7  7.5  10.6  8.6  10.7
Chad\1  -3.4  6.1  -14.1  10.1  26.1  8.5  -3.1  6.0  2.3  0.5  13.8  13.8
Congo  \1  -5.6  -1.1  -5.0  1.8  5.8  6.4  2.6  3.9  13.4  -1.3  5.5  5.5
Cote  d'lvolre  -1.0  1.8  3.1  5.3  0.4  -0.8  -1.6  4.2  7.3  5.2  3.4  4.8
Gabon  \1  -7.6  -2.9  1.6  23.4  -17.8  9.0  18.3  1.3  1.0  8.4  20.3  20.3
Gambia,  The  -2.1  -1.9  -11.1  -7.9  -29.9  -6.0  3.6  6.2  0.6  2.5  2.9  6.9
Ghana  \1  -8.8  -50.0  -20.2  4.3  -7.1  -16.3  -10.5  -7.0  NA  10.2  5.7
Kenya  -9.8  0.7  2.7  -1.1  6.2  3.4  -0.8  -2.3  -3.1  -5.1  NA
Madagascar  -18.5  -8.9  1.2  2.1  -1.9  -3.0  -12.1  2.3  NA  NA  NA  NA
Malawi  \1  -0.1  -3.3  -8.4  1.1  -1.4  -9.9  -14.7  0.9  0.8  -0.5  -8.3  -5.1
Mali \1  1,6  -0.3  -2.2  -9X'  16.6  6.4  3.3  6.2  3.3  2.8  2.8  3.5
Mauritania  \1  -3.9  -0.5  -7.1  4.4  -0.1  -3.2  0.7  -2.4  2.0  42  4.4  4.4
Mozambique  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Niger  \1  -4.8  10.5  -0.8  8.2  10.8  13.7  6.7  8.3  7.3  16.0  12.0  12.8
Nigeria  -1.8  -12.7  -23.0  0.8  3.2  -1.8  -26.8  -24.9  6.8  6.0  -20.5  -24.9
Rwanda  -5.6  -0.3  0.8  4.4  7.6  2.0  3.2  5.2  2.0  -10.7  -0.7  -4.1
Senegal  -9.5  -3.5  -3.8  -5.1  1.0  10.7  7.2  4.8  6.1  8.9  7.1  8.4
Sierra  Leone  \1  -13.3  -34.7  -33.4  -36.6  -38.4  -59.5  -14.2  -28.5  43.1  -30.7  -39.6  -8.5
Tanzania  \1  -19.3  -18.1  -23.6  -22.0  -21.1  -16.5  -11.8  -6.7  -2.3  NA  NA  NA
Togo  4.4  -1.5  11.4  9.2  3.0  6.0  5.4  6.1  5.3  6.6  6.5  8.8
Uganda  -28.2  -12.1  -22.5  -55.0  -54.0  -55.9  -59.5  -24.7  -0.7  2.5  -14.0  28.1
Zambia  -6.5  -11.4  -10.8  -21.5  -24.0  -17.7  -27.2  -51.1  48.8  -35.1  48.3
Zimbabwe  -2.9  -7.0  -6.1  1.7  -3.8  -1.9  2.0  -2.8  -7.3  -11.8  NA  NA
Source:  IMF,  IFS  data.
Note:  Real  interest  rate  is calculated  as  the  deposit  Interest  rate  less  the  expected  inflation  rate  divided  by  (1  +  the  expected  inflation  rate).
The  Inflation  rate  in  the  following  period  was  used  as  a proxy  for  the  expected  rate  of Inflation.
\1 Inflation  rate  of 1992  was  used  since  1993  inflaton  rates  were  not  available.Table B7. Real Effective Exchange Rates
(Index,1980=100)
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Benin  107.6  115.8  125.0  137.3  145.6  126.0  105.0  116.0  114.3  111.1  114.0  110.0
Burkina  Faso  114.9  118.2  120.4  120.3  114.3  103.8  97.7  101.5  103.5  98.4  98.4  98.0
Burundi  83.1  75.5  69.9  75.3  73.9  85.9  100.4  114.0  112.6  129.8  129.3  153.5
Cameroon  109.8  112.4  111.0  113.8  115.5  107.2  79.6  79.3  84.9  80.4  84.1  80.3
Central  African  Republic  105.6  107.8  107.0  112.1  104.0  94.1  96.9  107.1  110.9  107.3  115.7  112.6
Chad  111.3  118.1  120.8  117.7  114.6  110.8  99.8  96.1  104.4  99.2  99.2  103.8
Congo  99.4  101.0  103.2  95.5  93.7  91.7  91.4  90.6  91.1  904  89.7  91.1
Cote  divolre  119.2  132.0  139.0  140.3  138.3  111.9  96.3  95.6  99.4  96.0  99A  93.9
Gabon  111.3  110.0  113.1  117.6  114.0  103.8  104.3  121.3  118.8  106.5  112.2  124.9
Gambia  104.6  104.0  103.4  111.3  101.8  141.6  134.1  123.9  128.8  137.3  145.1  139.3
Ghana  44.9  35.9  53.4  138.5  190.4  331.7  430.4  451.2  479.6  480.2  463.1  518.4
Guinea  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  KA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Guinea-Bissau  NA  Pu.  NA  NA  KA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Kenya  103.6  96.7  105.3  98.3  99.7  114.0  123.2  129.6  131.7  143.0  146.1  139.3
Madagascar  94.5  89.5  88.8  103.6  109.2  115.6  169.8  194.7  204.0  193.0  221.2  208.0
Malawi  99.9  104.2  102.3  103.4  103.3  115.0  123.7  118.7  110.1  109.7  105.0  113.3
Mall  111.7  125.7  130.9  134.8  127.8  119.3  113.1  115.8  117.1  108.8  109.5  105.0
Mauritania  86.3  79.5  80.5  85.3  91.2  100.3  106.0  114.7  116.2  120.7  118.6  117.6
Mozambique  102.5  88.8  73.6  55.4  40.2  32.7  83.8  130.5  126.4  127.0  165.0  182.0
Niger  98.2  101.7  120.7  129.1  133.4  115.6  106.2  118.4  126.2  122.7  137.0  137.7
Nigeria  90.2  87.9  74.4  54.0  59.3  108.0  335.4  290.6  325.9  352.2  417.8  504.2
Rwanda  89.7  76.4  70.7  68.9  68.5  75.1  75.3  74.5  76.1  83.4  109.9  114.7
Senegal  114.6  112.8  115.2  116.2  105.4  87.8  84.5  93.2  98.1  93.9  994  96.9
Sierra  Leone  86.7  70.0  57.5  46.4  52.4  71.3  92.1  77.9  89.5  122.8  122.4  133.9
Tanzania  77.1  65.1  58.3  56.6  48.8  70.5  143.2  182.7  208.7  271.9  254.0  298.5
Togo  105.2  110.7  111.5  120.1  123.3  106.4  99.9  106.8  112.8  108.2  113.1  107.9
Ug.  nda  141.3  407.2  518.1  767.1  587.5  558.1  435.3  481.7  568.7  931.1  1214.9  1332.6
Zambia  97.8  87.8  94.7  110.1  119.1  247.3  234.3  150.9  118.1  135.0  152.4  142.7
Zimbabwe  97.0  86.2  96.9  98.9  109.0  118.4  124.1  133.8  140.9  161.1  192.7  214.6
Source:  World  Bank  and  IMF  staff  estimates.
An lncrease  in the  Index  represents  a depreciation  of  the  REER.Table B8. Black Market Premium
(Percent  deviation  trom  the  official  exchange  rate)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993
Benin
Burkina  Faso
Burundi  17.8  15.6  33.3  10.7  40.9  2.0  19.0  11.8  25.4  16.9  5.8  36.1  54.3  41.2
Cameroon





Gambia, The  1.1  3.7  -8.3  3.6  10.1  7.0  12.2  29.4  36.5  -14.1  2.8  -7.0  -1.4  2.5
Ghana  304.0  1718.2  4263.7  223.3  100.0  141.7  142.2  28.9  34.9  17.2  7.3  0.4  11.4  1A
Guinea  122.2  253.8  436.2  642.2  1091.2  1435.1  78.2  11.4  6.4  -4.6  12.5  2.7  8.4  21.5
Guinea-Bissau  48.2  97.1  33.9  17.5  321  4.4  -2.3  11.3  -28.9  4.7
Kenya  9.7  21.5  29.7  17.4  17.4  -2.0  8.6  21.1  12.9  4.2  5.9  8.8  107.1  32.0
Madagascar  17.4  33.6  90.4  79.6  33.7  8.8  5.9  29.6  16.3  3.1  7.1  31.0  7.3  9.5
Malawi  95.3  107.9  49.4  60.4  52.1  29.5  22.0  13.2  27.2  33.3  14.5  444  33.8  32.4
Mali
Mauritania  41.2  10.3  13.3  157.8  130.3  118.7  136.2  172.3  164.1  199.2  169.8  163.4  134.6  812
Mozambique  118.7  87.8  134.5  248.0  2880.8  3705.7  4337.5  116.1  43.0  16.8  94.0  /  -1.6  5.0  4.6
a  Niger
Nigeria  71.7  46.7  84.2  456.6  341.9  270.5  131.9  20.7  88.8  18.6  23.4  28.8  42.5  128.5
Rwanda  23.9  20.6  46.5  49.2  68.6  47.9  29.5  22.9  30.4  35.3  28.0  87.0  98.3  102.9
Senegal
Sierra Leone  34.9  46.8  50.2  37.4  73.2  47.7  40.5  117.0  1405.9  512.0  165.0  437  90.0  16.9
Tanzania  223.9  192,6  204.7  301.4  286.6  259A  248.0  138.9  100.0  35.2  780  71.0  194  1.7
Togo
Uganda  917.4  246.4  155.2  50.0  9.6  25.0  650.0  366.7  260.6  67.0  39.8  9.3  17.1  33.6
Zambia  70.5  38.1  45.4  27.3  97.6  35.0  31.1  78.6  899.6  413.2  211.9  87.3  0.7  33.3
Zimbabwe  84.4  53.2  51.1  191.8  79.9  41.7  70.3  50.3  47.1  76.2  14.9  32.0  30.3  22.2
Source:  IMF,  IFS  data  and  Intemational  Currency  Yearbook
Note: End  of period  data. Premium  = (Black  market  rate  minus  the offidal  rate)/  Offidal  rate.Table BB. Real  GDP  per Capita  Growth
(percent  change)
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993
Benin  6.0  -0.3  -7.1  5.0  4.2  -1.1  -4.8  0.8  -5.5  0.2  1.7  0.8  0.4
Burkina Faso  1.5  8.3  -1.4  -4.1  6.7  3.1  -1.6  3.1  04  -3.0  3.3  -2-2  -2.5
Burundi  9.2  -3.8  0.8  -2.5  8.5  0.2  2.6  1.8  -1.3  0.6  2.2  -0.2  -3.8
Cameroon  9.7  -0.2  4.9  3.1  4.9  5.1  -5.3  -11.6  -2.1  -9.7  -9.8  -8.0  -7.7
Central African  Republic  -4.7  4.8  -9.1  6.6  1.3  -1.4  -5.3  -0.2  -0.1  -2.0  -4.2  -4.8  4.8
Chad  -1.1  3.0  13.7  0.7  17.8  -7.0  -5.1  13A  2a6  -1.9  4.1  -2.2  -5.3
Congo  10.7  22.4  4.6  3.8  -4.2  -9.7  -2.9  -1A  -0.6  -2.3  -1.7  -0.0  -5.2
Cote  d'Ivoire  -0.2  -3.9  -6.6  -6.4  0.6  -0.4  -5.2  -5.6  -4.6  -5.6  -4.4  -36  -4.6
Gabon  -2.4  -5.8  -1.1  2.7  -64A  -3.4  -19.3  10.6  3-9  0.8  317  -5.0  -0.3
Gambia,  The  6.2  8.8  -7.8  -1.3  0.2  -1.7  -2.6  2.2  1.5  -3.0  1.8  -1.8  -1.5
Ghana  -5.5  -9.3  -7.5  5.0  1.3  1.5  1.1  2.1  1.7  -0.0  2.1  0.6  1.8
Guinea  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.2  3.0  0.1  1.2  -OA  0.3  1.6
Guinea-Bissau  16.7  2.6  -4.9  3.8  2.5  -2.9  3.4  4.6  2.9  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.9
Kenya  0.1  -2.0  -2.4  -2.0  0.7  3.6  2.5  2.9  1.6  1.3  -1.4  -3.5  -1.7
Madagascar  -12.2  -4.5  -1.7  -1.1  -1.7  -1.1  -1.9  0.2  0.8  -0.0  -9.3  -1.7  -1.0
Malawi  -8.1  -0.6  0.5  2.2  1.2  -3.8  -1.6  -0.5  1.7  1.1  2.9  -10.7  6.0
Mali  -2.3  1.8  -7.8  -0.2  -0.2  11.1  -1.2  -4.8  92  -2.2  -. 8  02  4.5
Mauritania  1.5  -4.1  2.7  -7.5  0.6  3.2  -0.4  -0.8  14  -4.7  0.0  -0.9  21
Mozambique  3.2  -10.6  -18.0  -7.4  -3.2  -4.8  10.3  6.8  3.8  -1.6  2.3  -3;2  182
Niger  -2.4  -5.2  -3.3  -20.6  -0.0  3.4  -5.7  1.8  -64  2.0  -0.7  -9.5  -1.9
Nigeria  -12.0  -3.9  -9.5  -7.2  6.0  -1.3  -3.1  6.6  3.7  2.6  2.1  1.2  -0.0
Rwanda  5.6  -1.1  3A  -7.3  -0.1  2.0  -34  -3.7  -1.5  -25  -4.8  40.0  0.9
Senegal  -4.4  12.0  -0.7  -6.8  1.0  1.5  0.9  2.0  -3.3  1.3  -1.7  -1.5  -4.6
Sierra Leone  5.5  1.5  -7.7  2.2  -7.8  -4.3  2.9  -0.4  0.2  2.2  0.0  -6.9  -1.9
Tanzania  -4.1  -3.5  -3.5  1.5  -1.8  2.4  1.8  42  5.3  4.1  -1.3  0.7  NA
Togo  -6.2  -6.5  -8.0  2.8  2.8  -1.8  -3.0  2.5  0.2  -3.5  -4A4  -124  -15.4
Uganda  NA  NA  NA  -6.6  . -1.3  -IA  3.5  4.8  3.7  0.5  0.2  -0.3  3.0
Zambia  2.3  -8.0  -5.2  -4.0  -1.6  -3.1  4.0  24  -3.8  -2.5  -3.6  -5.6  3.6
Zimbabwe  10.2  -0.6  -1.9  -5.6  2.9  -2.8  -4.1  4.3  1.3  -1.0  1.9  -10.9  -4.6
Source:  World  Bank  data.Table  B10. Gross Domestic  Investment
(Percent  of  GDP)
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993
Benin  ~~~~15.7  27.0  17.3  12.8  8.9  13.5  12.9  12.8  11.8  14.2  14.3  13.8  15.2
Burkina Faso  15.9  20.1  19.2  15.9  24.2  24.5  19.1  21.6  21.2  19.1  22.7  214  22.1
Burundi  17.0  14.5  22.8  18.4  13.9  11.7  22.6  15.0  16.5  16.9  16.B  18.6  2.3
Cameroon  24.7  23.4  24.4  20.8  24.9  30.8  34.3  21.8  18.5  14.6  126  11.1  10.8
CentralAfricanRepublic  B.7  8.7  11.8  12.3  14.5  12.2  12.5  10.6  16.2  10.2  11.8  11I8  8.6
Chad  NA  3.5  3.1  5.4  8.2  9.1  10.2  7.9  9.0  9A  8.1  8.5  9.4
Congo  48.2  59.7  38.4  30.4  30.3  29.5  19.7  18.6  13.7  16.4  19.5  16.8  142
Cote d'Ivoire  25.9  23.2  18.4  11.2  12.6  11.1  12.2  14A  8A  9.3  10.0  10.9  9.3
G  abon  36.4  35.0  35.2  33.0  38.3  45.5  25.5  37.5  32.4  24.4  26.6  21.4  21.6
Gambia, The  24.5  20.6  17.3  19.2  12.5  19.6  15.5  17.6  20.4  19.7  19.7  19.6  NA
Ghana  4.6  3.4  3.7  6.9  9.6  9.7  13.4  14.2  15.5  14A  15.9  12.6  14.8
Guinea.  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  14.1  15.6  15.9  15.6  17.6  15.9  16.9  16A
Guinea-Bissau  25.7  28.3  22.7  30.0  32.0  24.3  34.2  34.2  37.1  24.5  27.0  26.5  24.0
Kenya  27.7  21.8  20.8  20.7  26.0  21.8  24.3  25.0  24.7  24.3  21.3  17.5  16.1
Madagascar  11.5  8.5  8.4  8.6  8.8  9.0  10.1  13.3  134  17.0  8.2  11.3  11.7
Malawi  17.6  21.4  22.8  12.9  18.6  12.3  15.4  18.7  20.2  19.1  20.0  18.8  12.9
Mali  17.5  17.6  14.6  15.2  17.4  20.7  22.3  21.0  21.3  22A  23.1  21.9  21.9
al  Mauritania  41.9  47.1  17.8  25.1  28.9  30.6  29.2  28.0  18.5  20.0  17.9  22.5  24.8
Mozambique  22.8  22.8  12.2  13.9  9.1  18.8  26.2  34.8  34.6  35.1  39.0  38A  41.5
Niger  20.3  18.2  12.8  3.2  15.3  13.3  10.5  19.8  12.3  8.1  9.2  54  5.7
Nigeria  23.3  20.0  14.7  9.5  9.0  15.1  13.7  13.5  14.1  14.6  16.3  182  NA
Rwanda  13.3  17.8  13.5  15.8  17.3  15.9  15.6  15.0  13.9  13.6  14.3  15.6  NA
Senegal  11.9  11.3  11.9  11.7  9.8  11.0  12A  12.7  11.8  12.9  13.3  13A  14.1
Sierra Leone  19.1  13.4  14.3  12.7  10.0  11.2  10.4  7.9  13.5  14.0  11.9  11.7  9.2
Tanzania  24.7  21.0  13.6  15.3  15.7  19.5  30.4  30.6  34A  46.6  38.5  41.9  NA
Togo  30.2  26.3  22.1  21.2  24.1  27.8  22.2  24.8  25.0  25$4  22.8  21.9  11.7
Uganda  5.0  9.1  7.4  7.8  6O5  8.2  10.9  10.3  10.5  14.1  16.0  14A  14.5
Zambia  19.3  16.8  13.8  14.7  14.9  23.8  13.9  11.4  10.8  17.3  14.7  14.1  10.7
Zimbabwe  23.1  21.2  16.9  18.9  19.8  18.6  17.2  21.7  19.8  20A  25.0  24.3  22.5
Source: World Bank data.Table B11. Real  Export Growth
(Percentage  change)
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993
Benin  9.19  -25.90  -27.46  37.20  27.67  -8.85  5.30  -8.58  -25.90  1.14  7.44  12.88  -2.17
Burkina Faso  13.16  -13.95  -21.62  13.79  -1.08  9.44  19.76  -6.05  -8.44  32.16  -3.49  0.29  8.80
Burundi  58.97  7.96  -9.99  14.38  12.65  -13.09  6.82  10.61  .2.87  -5.58  16.32  1.10  -35.10
Cameroon  22.09  .4.55  20.16  32.82  13.87  -2.05  -0.33  -5.78  43.31  0.50  -4.20  1.00  -3.60
Central African Republic  3.81  -20.05  2.45  0.60  3.86  -12.43  -7.80  -6.09  11.89  -6.44  -13.77  -10.38  26.06
Chad  -9.83  -46.02  143.89  12.00  -19.82  8.31  12.30  12.46  5.29  11.68  -16.57  -6.68  -25.78
Congo  9.26  9.14  17.26  9.79  -6.50  -3.47  0.39  13.04  8.65  6.10  -6.11  8.93  11.51
Cote d'[voire  3.14  3.05  -4.94  10.60  -3.00  -2.70  -16.70  -5.70  18.39  6.50  -4.80  3.20  -1.71
Gabon  -7.22  -1.79  4.25  23.49  -6.91  -9.21  -6.37  3.29  34.14  11.06  2.80  3.68  6.08
Gambia, The  24.87  8.49  -6.02  -34.71  9.01  -5.29  3.68  24.51  21.53  2.38  4.21  NA  NA
Ghana  -8.85  15.24  -45.78  9.65  6.36  50.57  -3.82  11.11  11.48  4128  14.88  6.40  21.76
Guinea  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  6.67  10.42  4.94  -0.69  1.08  -7.16  9.24
Guinea-Biasau  -28.33  -10.50  -7.40  36.71  -27.60  10.61  21.49  8.49  4.40  74.98  23.00  -30.00  63.73
Kenya  -4.19  3.18  -2.28  0.87  6.72  9.77  0.11  4.76  9.88  18.03  -0.87  -0.94  49.38
Madagascar  -26.21  -7.30  -12.34  5.39  -3.18  -0.05  2.87  -8.24  16.93  11.96  4.76  1.97  3.37
Malawi  -17.90  -9.97  3.31  32.78  5.05  -3.57  1.14  2.00  -14.90  24.88  5.32  -1.82  .3.58
Mali  -6.26  1.66  10.43  5.92  -0.75  3.35  -0.10  6.60  5.91  6.13  15.15  8.37  4.77
Mauritania  23.08  -8.26  29.74  .6.57  10.33  -2.02  1.66  0.98  0.44  -5.45  -2.83  -10.17  5.16
Mozambique  -10.99  7.83  -37.10  -37.18  -2.01  -1.49  8.67  5.45  8.67  8.32  31.19  1.79  3.40
Niger  -2.02  -22.68  6.15  -9.36  -10.02  -4.58  -0.43  3.31  -0.77  -1.61  -2.57  -14.34  18.62
Nigeria  -35.38  -19.97  -5.26  14.58  13.32  -0.25  -8.79  8.67  11.90  8.78  3.70  1.32  NA
Rwanda  1.24  1.84  6.54  -0.84  3.47  14.61  12.13  -17.12  -7.12  24.87  -13.84  -7.07  6.51
Senegal  -0.44  33.48  1.31  2.93  -15.86  16.16  -2.20  8.89  -2.95  -1.19  2.42  3.01  -1.31
Sierra Leone  -31.61  -13.68  -22.16  4.41  -1.78  *1.77  -9.45  1.21  -24.22  26.58  -5.90  43.46  -9.19
Tanzania  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Togo  -12.73  0.10  -11.43  0.21  3.33  19.52  8.77  6.31  -11.67  -10.62  2.85  -12.85  -27.57
Uganda  NA  NA  NA  8.95  11.28  -15.15  -0.20  4.36  14.68  -4.82  7.58  -2.65  24.01
Zambia  -12.75  15.69  -9.74  -6.85  -1.69  1.89  -5.93  -5.85  -1.41  15.95  -16.07  14.57  -2.10
Zimbabwe  7.67  2.49  0.35  -6.67  27.64  16.4Z  -4.87  4.72  5.39  0.74  -0.25  -15.94  4.62
Source:  World  Bank data.Table B1  2. Not  Aggregate  Transfers
(Percent  of  GDP)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1986  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1980-92
Benin  7.37  10.29  18.92  9.17  2.43  2.18  4.45  6.93  6.69  15.71  10.60  11.46  10A3  8.97
Burkina Faso  9.46  12.95  11.42  11.97  10.32  9.35  9.89  9.25  8.85  8.27  8.05  11.91  12.53  10.33
Burundi  8.39  8.58  8.01  12.97  10.69  7.79  10.56  11.37  11.71  13.70  16.62  14.46  19.86  11.90
Cameroon  5.34  2.47  0.59  2.97  1.01  -3.18  -0.66  -0.38  2.10  6.58  5.68  I90  5.77  141
Central African  Republic  11.02  12.62  7.63  8.32  10.71  9.48  10.22  11.36  14.37  10.06  14.81  12.66  99  10.94
Chad  2.96  10.92  8.85  14.47  14,62  17.23  16.63  18.29  19.49  21.17  20.51  15.07  21.38  15.51
Congo  27.41  7.21  19.77  9.41  5.75  4.47  2.32  1.02  11.45  -3.97  45.09  -7.10  -1.54  5.47
Cote d'lvoire  4.82  4.83  4.21  -0.86  -5.21  -9.02  -8.13  -3.41  -0.63  -0.12  4.08  0.69  0.39  -0.64
Gabon  *5.25  -6.29  *4.62  -2.59  0.71  2.51  9.14  5.33  7.47  2.18  1.57  -1.32  -4.04  0.37
Gambia,  The  34.83  39.20  25.53  9.07  22.35  12.87  28.07  29.83  19.30  21.61  12.05  14.07  17.17  22.00
Ghana  2.94  1.54  1.23  8.48  7.03  5.35  5.77  4.10  4.74  6.21  9.45  11.43  8.61  5.91
Guinea  NA  NA  FA  NA  NA  NA  9.28  4.07  9.43  10.79  4.15  8.62  8.91  7.73
Guinea-Bissau  96.37  37.03  29.12  25.74  45.64  53.44  43.08  48.88  40.51  62.27  32.21  29.70  32.63  43.59
Kenya  6.39  2.87  5.14  5.96  1.95  2.42  1.89  3.06  6.90  7.13  13.46  4.15  2.68  4.92
Madagascar  9.63  8.30  9.00  8.50  6.22  4.15  7.77  6.28  5.77  6.24  10.27  11.95  12.10  .17
Malawi  13.56  10.02  4.19  5.53  7.11  2.27  5.57  11.73  16.85  15.47  15.08  13.92  16.22  10.50
Mali  12.25  16.04  17.37  21.39  22.42  18.38  17.00  12.40  13.66  15.02  12.56  11.96  1124  15.59
Mauritania  24.79  23.54  30.83  23.64  18.67  21.47  21.90  15.31  11.66  15.95  8.42  8.45  15.30  18.46
Mozambique  3.14  3.79  4.11  8.90  51.77  14.85  14.06  50.69  55.54  53.66  63.14  74.90  104.33  38.69
Niger  8.63  15.24  6.06  7.28  5.42  13.89  11.38  9.37  8.04  10.75  11.72  9.28  14.83  10.07
Nigeria  1.05  2.24  2.61  1.04  -1.74  -2.97  -0.99  1.27  -3.43  -1.41  -6.43  -6.95  -9.46  -1.94
s  Rwanda  8.32  7.12  7.32  6.50  7.14  7.81  7.03  7.08  7.15  5.85  8.28  15.26  1541  8.48
Senegal  7.85  12.40  13.00  16.40  9.67  6.20  9.42  7.63  3.56  7.63  8.87  4.86  7.01  8.81
Sierra Leone  6.60  5.50  5.86  3.20  3.19  6.88  1.68  5.87  6.66  5.63  7.68  9.69  7.84  5.84
Tanzania  16.17  10.11  8.72  7.89  10.42  4.36  13.39  17.78  24.43  22.89  37.67  28.78  38.73  18.54
Togoi  8.76  2.37  2.40  9.59  2.97  14.76  1.35  0.49  6.11  5.21  8.65  6.04  6.55  5.71
Uganda  14.17  18.37  9.26  8.81  3.60  2.98  2.60  9.12  10.25  11.85  17.33  15.49  14.27  10.62
Zambia  9.10  11.86  3.01  4.48  9.43  11.80  20.27  9.48  8.15  4.63  16.98  4.78  N  9.50
Zimbabwe  3.90  6.19  9.20  5.94  2.14  -0.81  -2.76  -1.91  -1.64  1.26  2.94  2.99  11.63  3.01
Source: World  Bank data.
Note:  Net  transfers  on  IMF  and  LT  debt  plus  grants,  excluding  tecinical  assistance.  Annual  net  transfer  shock  Is  calculated  as  the  percentage  change  in  not  aggregate  trandses.
The  net  transfer  shock  for  the  regressions  Is  defined  as  the  difference  In  the  average  of  the  annual  net  transfer  shock  for  the  periods  1987-92  and  1981-86  tines  the
the  average  of  net  aggregate  transfers  for  the  whole  period.Table  813. BarterTerms  of  Trade  Average
(Price  of  merchandise  exportsu  price  of  merchandise  Imports  Expoul  Share
(percent  of  GDP)
1950  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1Mgq  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1981-199
Benin  1.14  1.17  1.05  1.08  1.11  1.03  0.77  1.00  0.81  0.83  0.87  0.83  0.74  6.92
Burkina  Faso  1,35  1.19  1.12  1.27  1.27  1.08  0.90  1.00  0.96  1.01  0.99  0.99  0.88  5.50
Burundi  1.33  1.09  1.24  1.21  1.36  1.33  1.58  1.00  0.85  0.68  0.48  0.44  0.38  &74
Cameroon  1.51  1.48  1.44  1.42  1.46  1.89  0.98  1.00  0.87  0.82  0.76  0.70  0.66  11.98
Central  African  Republic  1.22  1.07  1.10  1.09  1.16  1.07  1.18  1.00  0.88  0.77  0.67  0.66  0.61  10.87
Chad  1.00  0.98  1.18  1.00  1.00  1.09  1.00  1.00  0.98  0.93  0.94  0.96  078  14.28
Congo  1.54  1.64  1.57  1.49  1.51  1.45  0.87  1.00  0.74  0.87  1.04  0.89  0.86  46.13
Cote  d'Ivoire  1.14  0.96  0.99  1.05  1.13  1.10  1.20  1.00  0.89  0.77  0.69  0.68  0.65  3.85
Gabon  1.54  1.65  1.57  1.47  1.47  1.40  0.87  1.00  0.77  0.90  1.06  0.91  0.89  42.65
Gambin,  The  1.20  1.27  1.08  1.13  1.25  1.16  1.05  1.00  1.00  1.25  1.31  1.22  1.12  17.42
Ghana  1.17  0.97  0.87  1.06  1.14  1.06  1.03  1.00  1.00  0.78  0.53  0.51  0.45  16A2
Guinea  1.50  1.62  1.40  1.31  1.26  1.20  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.97  1.05  0.97  0.84  27.59
Guinea-Bissau  0.37  0.79  0.74  0.75  0.90  0.91  1.00  1.00  1.11  1.20  1.06  1.10  1.15  5.28
Kenya  1.24  1.13  1.10  1.15  1.27  1.14  1.37  1.00  0.97  0.89  0.74  0.72  0.67  14.50
Madagascar  0.95  0.82  0.89  0.90  0.94  0.98  1.32  1.00  1.09  1.00  0.86  0.58  0.85  10.45
Malawi  1.51  1.31  1,26  1.26  1.32  1.04  1.10  1.00  0.98  0.98  0.92  0.95  0.90  21.16
Mali  1.16  1.08  0.97  1.09  1.09  0.95  0.87  1.00  0.99  1.01  0.96  1.00  0.86  14.84
Mauritania  1.01  1.04  1.10  1.07  1.10  1.13  1.19  1.00  0.89  0.96  1.05  1.15  1.07  41.52
Mozambique  0.81  0.90  0.77  0.82  0.95  O.93  1.08  1.00  0.94  0.93  0.93  0.96  0.91  1426
Niger  1.16  1.17  1.21  1.25  1.24  1.26  1.17  1.00  1.35  1.31  1.10  1.04  LOO  16.13
Nigeria  1.86  2.04  1.88  1.83  1.85  1.67  0.83  1.00  0.72  0.85  1.03  0.87  0.84  23.61
Rwanda  1.13  0.97  1.06  1.04  1.16  1.16  1.56  1.00  0.97  0.89  0.72  0.74  0.58  8.51
Senegal  1.05  1.09  1.03  1.05  1.10  1.06  0.95  1.00  0.98  1.05  1.14  1.12  L06  17.67
Sierra  Leone  1.06  1.01  1.03  1.05  1.11  1.06  1.06  1.00  1.04  0.95  0.85  0.85  0.80  14.77
Tanzania  1.12  0.95  0.99  1.02  1.08  1.01  1.16  1.00  0.97  0.92  0.79  0.78  0.71  9.23
Togo  1.29  1.33  1.25  1.18  1.26  1.18  1.08  1.00  0.98  1.02  0.96  0.98  0.91  19.66
Uganda  1.49  1.20  1.32  1.33  1.49  1.43  1.73  1.00  0.92  0.74  0.52  0.49  0.42  11.84
Zambia  1.25  1.00  0.89  0.98  0.88  0.90  0.90  1.00  1.39  1.47  1.25  1.14  1.09  33.80
Zimbabwe  1.18  1.06  0.99  1.08  1.08  1.00  0.92  1.00  1.15  1.15  1.03  1.06  1.01  20.49
Source: World Bank data.
Note:  Annual  terms  of  trade  shock  calculated  as  the  percentage  change  In  the  terms  of  trade  times  the  average  export  share.  The  terms  of  trade  shock  used  in  the  regresaions
Is defined  as the  difference  In  the  average  of  the  annual  terms  of  trade  shocks  for  the  perlods  1987-92  and  1981-86  times  the  average  export  share.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Serles
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